From: "Jon Rosen (jrosen)" <jrosen@cisco.com>
To: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>,
"Rosen, Rami" <rami.rosen@intel.com>,
"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"Mike Maloney" <maloney@google.com>,
Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"open list:NETWORKING [GENERAL]" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v2] packet: track ring entry use using a shadow ring to prevent RX ring overrun
Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 14:12:13 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <00de829386b04823bb58a555fb620317@XCH-RTP-016.cisco.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: CAF=yD-Kfto4jJYMFzn=PV8OYdhEmdNfW+aakDhRMzRBWhWY0UQ@mail.gmail.com
On Monday, May 21, 2018 2:17 PM, Jon Rosen (jrosen) <jrosen@cisco.com> wrote:
> On Monday, May 21, 2018 1:07 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, May 21, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Jon Rosen (jrosen) <jrosen@cisco.com> wrote:
...snip...
>>
>> A setsockopt for userspace to signal a stricter interpretation of
>> tp_status to elide the shadow hack could then be considered.
>> It's not pretty. Either way, no full new version is required.
>>
>>> As much as I would like to find a solution that doesn't require
>>> the spin lock I have yet to do so. Maybe the answer is that
>>> existing applications will need to suffer the performance impact
>>> but a new version or option for TPACKET_V1/V2 could be added to
>>> indicate strict adherence of the TP_STATUS_USER bit and then the
>>> original diffs could be used.
It looks like adding new socket options is pretty rare so I
wonder if a better option might be to define a new TP_STATUS_XXX
bit which would signal from a userspace application to the kernel
that it strictly interprets the TP_STATUS_USER bit to determine
ownership.
Todays applications set tp_status = TP_STATUS_KERNEL(0) for the
kernel to pick up the entry. We could define a new value to pass
ownership as well as one to indicate to other kernel threads that
an entry is inuse:
#define TP_STATUS_USER_TO_KERNEL (1 << 8)
#define TP_STATUS_INUSE (1 << 9)
If the kernel sees tp_status == TP_STATUS_KERNEL then it should
use the shadow method for tacking ownership. If it sees tp_status
== TP_STATUS_USER_TO_KERNEL then it can use the TP_STATUS_INUSE
method.
>>>
>>> There is another option I was considering but have yet to try
>>> which would avoid needing a shadow ring by using counter(s) to
>>> track maximum sequence number queued to userspace vs. the next
>>> sequence number to be allocated in the ring. If the difference
>>> is greater than the size of the ring then the ring can be
>>> considered full and the allocation would fail. Of course this may
>>> create an additional hotspot between cores, not sure if that
>>> would be significant or not.
>>
>> Please do have a look, but I don't think that this will work in this
>> case in practice. It requires tracking the producer tail. Updating
>> the slowest writer requires probing each subsequent slot's status
>> byte to find the new tail, which is a lot of (by then cold) cacheline
>> reads.
>
> I've thought about it a little more and am not convinced it's
> workable but I'll spend a little more time on it before giving
> up.
I've given up on this method. Just don't see how to make it work.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-22 14:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-19 12:07 [PATCH v2] packet: track ring entry use using a shadow ring to prevent RX ring overrun Jon Rosen
2018-05-20 22:51 ` Willem de Bruijn
2018-05-20 23:22 ` Willem de Bruijn
2018-05-21 12:57 ` Jon Rosen (jrosen)
2018-05-21 17:07 ` Willem de Bruijn
2018-05-21 18:16 ` Jon Rosen (jrosen)
2018-05-22 15:41 ` Willem de Bruijn
2018-05-23 11:08 ` Jon Rosen (jrosen)
2018-05-22 14:12 ` Jon Rosen (jrosen) [this message]
2018-05-22 15:46 ` Willem de Bruijn
2018-05-23 11:54 ` Jon Rosen (jrosen)
2018-05-23 13:37 ` Willem de Bruijn
2018-05-23 15:29 ` Jon Rosen (jrosen)
2018-05-23 15:53 ` Willem de Bruijn
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