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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
	Karel Srot <ksrot@redhat.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin	 <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn"	 <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"	
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	open list	 <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: Fall back to default kernel module signature verification
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2025 11:16:37 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <02d18fe0a0ca1223eec9af5c8e01739aa164bf32.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <559f6ebf4a19da321fffc2a3ca180dc3d6216a22.camel@linux.ibm.com>

On Mon, 2025-10-20 at 08:21 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Sat, 2025-10-18 at 07:19 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
> > > > > 2. Instead of defining an additional process_measurement() argument to identify
> > > > > compressed kernel modules, to simplify the code it might be possible to define a
> > > > > new "func" named COMPRESSED_MODULE_CHECK.
> > > > > 
> > > > > +       [READING_COMPRESSED_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,  -> COMPRESSED_MODULE_CHECK
> > > > 
> > > > I also thought about this approach. But IMA rule maps kernel module
> > > > loading to MODULE_CHECK. If we define a new rule and ask users to use
> > > > this new rule, ima_policy=secure_boot still won't work.
> > > 
> > > I don't have a problem with extending the "secure-boot" policy to support
> > > uncompressed kernel modules appended signatures, based on whether
> > > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is enabled.  The new rule would be in addition to the existing
> > > MODULE_CHECK rule.
> > 
> > I assume once the new rule get added, we can't remove it for userspace
> > backward compatibility, right? And with CPIO xattr supported, it seems
> > there is no need to keep this rule. So if this concern is valid, do you
> > think we shall switch to another approach i.e. to make IMA support
> > verifying decompressed module and then make "secure-boot" to allow
> > appended module signature?
> 
> Yes, once the rule is added, it wouldn't be removed.  As for "to make IMA
> support verifying decompressed module", yes that might be a better solution,
> than relying on "sig_enforce" being enabled. IMA already supports verifying the
> appended signatures.  A new IMA specific or LSM hook would need to be defined
> after module_decompress().

Looking at the code further, decompressing the kernel module in IMA is
redundant.  Instead I think the best approach would be to:
- define DECOMPRESSED_MODULE, in addition to COMPRESSED_MODULE.

id(COMPRESSED_MODULE, compressed-kernel-module) \
id(DECOMPRESSED_MODULE, decompressed-kernel-module)    \

- instead of passing a boolean indicating whether the module is compressed, pass
the kernel_read_file_id enumeration to differentiate between the compressed and
decompressed module.

- define a new IMA hook, probably LSM hook as well, named
ima_decompressed_module().

- call the new ima_decompressed_module() from init_module_from_file()
immediately after decompressing the kernel module.  Something along the lines
of:

err = ima_decompressed_module(f, (char *)info.hdr, info.len,
                              READING_DECOMPRESSED_MODULE);

For testing purposes to see the decompressed appended signature in the
measurement list, modify the MODULE_CHECK measure rule to include "template=ima-
modsig" in ima_efi.c.

-- 
Mimi


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-10-24 15:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-28  3:03 [PATCH] ima: Fall back to default kernel module signature verification Coiby Xu
2025-09-30 13:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-09-30 20:28   ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-16  3:46     ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-17  2:31       ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-17  3:19         ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-17 17:49           ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-17 23:19             ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-20 12:21               ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-20 12:45                 ` Roberto Sassu
2025-10-20 13:57                   ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-30  0:33                     ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-24 15:16                 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2025-10-30  0:31                   ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-30  3:01                     ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-30 13:42                       ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-30 16:50                         ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-31  7:58                           ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-02 17:17 ` kernel test robot
2025-10-16  3:51   ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-31  7:40 ` [PATCH v2] lsm,ima: new LSM hook security_kernel_module_read_file to access decompressed kernel module Coiby Xu
2025-11-01 16:50   ` Paul Moore
2025-11-02 15:05     ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-02 15:43       ` Paul Moore
2025-11-05  0:18         ` Coiby Xu
2025-11-05  2:47           ` Paul Moore
2025-11-05 14:07             ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-05 15:42               ` Paul Moore
2025-11-05 20:25                 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-06 13:35                   ` Coiby Xu
2025-11-05 20:47           ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-06 13:29             ` Coiby Xu
2025-11-06 22:15               ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-07 19:28                 ` Mimi Zohar

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