From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
Karel Srot <ksrot@redhat.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: Fall back to default kernel module signature verification
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2025 11:16:37 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <02d18fe0a0ca1223eec9af5c8e01739aa164bf32.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <559f6ebf4a19da321fffc2a3ca180dc3d6216a22.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On Mon, 2025-10-20 at 08:21 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Sat, 2025-10-18 at 07:19 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
> > > > > 2. Instead of defining an additional process_measurement() argument to identify
> > > > > compressed kernel modules, to simplify the code it might be possible to define a
> > > > > new "func" named COMPRESSED_MODULE_CHECK.
> > > > >
> > > > > + [READING_COMPRESSED_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, -> COMPRESSED_MODULE_CHECK
> > > >
> > > > I also thought about this approach. But IMA rule maps kernel module
> > > > loading to MODULE_CHECK. If we define a new rule and ask users to use
> > > > this new rule, ima_policy=secure_boot still won't work.
> > >
> > > I don't have a problem with extending the "secure-boot" policy to support
> > > uncompressed kernel modules appended signatures, based on whether
> > > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is enabled. The new rule would be in addition to the existing
> > > MODULE_CHECK rule.
> >
> > I assume once the new rule get added, we can't remove it for userspace
> > backward compatibility, right? And with CPIO xattr supported, it seems
> > there is no need to keep this rule. So if this concern is valid, do you
> > think we shall switch to another approach i.e. to make IMA support
> > verifying decompressed module and then make "secure-boot" to allow
> > appended module signature?
>
> Yes, once the rule is added, it wouldn't be removed. As for "to make IMA
> support verifying decompressed module", yes that might be a better solution,
> than relying on "sig_enforce" being enabled. IMA already supports verifying the
> appended signatures. A new IMA specific or LSM hook would need to be defined
> after module_decompress().
Looking at the code further, decompressing the kernel module in IMA is
redundant. Instead I think the best approach would be to:
- define DECOMPRESSED_MODULE, in addition to COMPRESSED_MODULE.
id(COMPRESSED_MODULE, compressed-kernel-module) \
id(DECOMPRESSED_MODULE, decompressed-kernel-module) \
- instead of passing a boolean indicating whether the module is compressed, pass
the kernel_read_file_id enumeration to differentiate between the compressed and
decompressed module.
- define a new IMA hook, probably LSM hook as well, named
ima_decompressed_module().
- call the new ima_decompressed_module() from init_module_from_file()
immediately after decompressing the kernel module. Something along the lines
of:
err = ima_decompressed_module(f, (char *)info.hdr, info.len,
READING_DECOMPRESSED_MODULE);
For testing purposes to see the decompressed appended signature in the
measurement list, modify the MODULE_CHECK measure rule to include "template=ima-
modsig" in ima_efi.c.
--
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-10-24 15:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-28 3:03 [PATCH] ima: Fall back to default kernel module signature verification Coiby Xu
2025-09-30 13:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-09-30 20:28 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-16 3:46 ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-17 2:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-17 3:19 ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-17 17:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-17 23:19 ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-20 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-20 12:45 ` Roberto Sassu
2025-10-20 13:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-30 0:33 ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-24 15:16 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2025-10-30 0:31 ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-30 3:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-30 13:42 ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-30 16:50 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-10-31 7:58 ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-02 17:17 ` kernel test robot
2025-10-16 3:51 ` Coiby Xu
2025-10-31 7:40 ` [PATCH v2] lsm,ima: new LSM hook security_kernel_module_read_file to access decompressed kernel module Coiby Xu
2025-11-01 16:50 ` Paul Moore
2025-11-02 15:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-02 15:43 ` Paul Moore
2025-11-05 0:18 ` Coiby Xu
2025-11-05 2:47 ` Paul Moore
2025-11-05 14:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-05 15:42 ` Paul Moore
2025-11-05 20:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-06 13:35 ` Coiby Xu
2025-11-05 20:47 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-06 13:29 ` Coiby Xu
2025-11-06 22:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-11-07 19:28 ` Mimi Zohar
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