From: "Fogh, Anders" <anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de>
To: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at"
<clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at>,
"moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at" <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>,
Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>,
Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not mapkernel in user mode
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 16:44:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <07322e2c-e95f-ea35-bc1f-7b05c082e287@gdata-adan.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8aecf7d4-9767-5367-1bc0-75fbd4b17e46@iaik.tugraz.at>
>> i.e. how does it perform on recent AMD systems?
Sorry for the latency. Recent AMD is reported by Enrique Nissem to not
be vulnerable to the prefetch attack. TSX attack doesn't apply to AMD.
Hund, Willems & Holz wrote in 2013 that AMD was vulnerable to that
attack. The BTB is almost surely working in a different manner of
fashion if at all. So AMD may or may not be vulnerable to the DPF
attack, but none of the modern attacks should work - at least out of the
box.
Best regards,
Anders
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-09 14:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-04 10:02 [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode Daniel Gruss
2017-05-04 12:26 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-04 15:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 8:23 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-05 15:47 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-06 4:02 ` David Gens
2017-05-06 8:38 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 10:21 ` Mark Rutland
2017-05-08 10:51 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 13:22 ` Mark Rutland
2017-05-08 13:43 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 13:53 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 14:09 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-08 14:19 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 13:23 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-04 15:47 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-05 7:40 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-07 20:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Richard Weinberger
2017-05-07 21:45 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-07 22:02 ` Richard Weinberger
2017-05-07 22:18 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-09 14:44 ` Fogh, Anders [this message]
2017-05-09 14:57 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not mapkernel " Richard Weinberger
2017-05-09 15:30 ` Rik van Riel
2017-10-31 23:28 ` Dave Hansen
2017-05-05 15:49 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel " Jann Horn
2017-05-05 15:53 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-06 8:28 ` Daniel Gruss
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