From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org,
chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de,
kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 12:23:54 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0c707e4f-88d8-4cad-a2ed-8db0e9d0b4ac@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240115181809.885385-15-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
On 1/15/24 13:17, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
> the path_post_mknod hook.
>
> IMA-appraisal requires all existing files in policy to have a file
> hash/signature stored in security.ima. An exception is made for empty files
> created by mknod, by tagging them as new files.
>
> LSMs could also take some action after files are created.
>
> The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
> reverted.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> fs/namei.c | 5 +++++
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
> security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index fb93d3e13df6..b7f433720b1e 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -4047,6 +4047,11 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode,
> dentry, mode, 0);
> break;
> }
> +
> + if (error)
> + goto out2;
> +
> + security_path_post_mknod(idmap, dentry);
> out2:
> done_path_create(&path, dentry);
> if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 229f84ce12ae..e08b9091350d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_mkdir, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_rmdir, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_mknod, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, path_post_mknod, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> + struct dentry *dentry)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_truncate, const struct path *path)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_symlink, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> const char *old_name)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2997348afcb7..977dd9f7f51a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1893,6 +1893,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t m
> int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
> unsigned int dev);
> +void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path);
> int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> const char *old_name);
> @@ -1927,6 +1928,10 @@ static inline int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *den
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> + struct dentry *dentry)
> +{ }
> +
> static inline int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 7d10724872f8..750bfe2768d5 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1800,6 +1800,20 @@ int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
>
> +/**
> + * security_path_post_mknod() - Update inode security field after file creation
> + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> + * @dentry: new file
> + *
> + * Update inode security field after a file has been created.
> + */
> +void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> + return;
> + call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed
> * @dir: parent directory
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-12 17:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-15 18:17 [PATCH v9 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 1/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 2/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 3/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 4/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 5/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 6/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 7/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 8/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 9/25] " Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 10:17 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 10:17 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:56 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-09 9:59 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-09 10:12 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-09 10:46 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-09 11:34 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-09 12:02 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-12 21:00 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-02-12 21:16 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-13 12:58 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-13 15:33 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-14 20:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-02-14 21:21 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-15 8:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-02-15 15:02 ` Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook Roberto Sassu
2024-01-15 19:15 ` Al Viro
2024-01-16 8:47 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 16:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-01-16 17:33 ` Al Viro
2024-01-16 18:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 10:15 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 17:21 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:54 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 17:23 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2024-01-15 18:17 ` [PATCH v9 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:53 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 17:26 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:51 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:52 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-12 17:37 ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-12 17:56 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-12 20:28 ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-13 8:57 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-13 16:31 ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-15 9:29 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 20/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 18:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:50 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 17:45 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 21/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 19:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:45 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 22/25] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-09 9:48 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-12 18:26 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 23/25] evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 19:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-12 19:13 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 24/25] ima: " Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 19:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-12 19:47 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-15 18:18 ` [PATCH v9 25/25] integrity: Remove LSM Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 19:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-08 3:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-12 19:50 ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-08 3:18 ` [PATCH v9 0/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Paul Moore
2024-02-08 8:05 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-08 14:16 ` Paul Moore
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