From: Luca Barbieri <ldb@ldb.ods.org>
To: trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no
Cc: Linux FSdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Initial support for struct vfs_cred [0/1]
Date: 01 Sep 2002 23:36:05 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1030916165.1993.348.camel@ldb> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <15730.27061.640906.564411@charged.uio.no>
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On Sun, 2002-09-01 at 21:25, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> >>>>> " " == Luca Barbieri <ldb@ldb.ods.org> writes:
>
> > But you'll need to modify the declaration of the various
> > function pointers whose implementations might need credentials
> > and modify all functions that call them and deal with
> > permissions. Instead with my proposal the credentials are
>
> Yes... And this is a useful activity in itself, as the existence of
> all these hacks that temporarily change uid/gid/whatever... show.
I disagree.
It reduces performance, and results in huge patches.
Furthermore you can't predict whether the target of a function pointer
will need credentials or not.
> > automatically immutable across the syscall without needing to
> > worry at all about locks, counts and sharing.
>
> I still have no opinion about your proposal for implementing CLONE_CRED.
>
> What I fail to see is why you appear to insist it would be
> incompatible with the idea of copy-on-write VFS credentials (which I
> explained are interesting for other purposes).
I don't insist on that (see below).
> I also fail to understand why you insist that we need to drop the idea
> of copy-on-write credentials in order to optimize for this fringe case
> in which somebody calls sys_access() or exec with euid != fsuid.
I do not propose to remove the idea of copy-on-write credentials, just
to use copy-on-write only for groups and "copy-always" for uid and gid
so that access to uid and gid doesn't need to go through the credentials
pointer.
You have code like this:
+ cred = get_current_vfscred();
fdata->fd_do_lml = 0;
- fdata->fd_fsuid = current->fsuid;
- fdata->fd_fsgid = current->fsgid;
+ fdata->fd_fsuid = cred->uid;
+ fdata->fd_fsgid = cred->gid;
fdata->fd_mode = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
- fdata->fd_ngroups = current->ngroups;
- for (i=0 ; i<current->ngroups ; i++)
- fdata->fd_groups[i] = current->groups[i];
+ fdata->fd_ngroups = cred->ngroups;
+ for (i=0 ; i<cred->ngroups ; i++)
+ fdata->fd_groups[i] = cred->groups[i];
fdata->fd_bytes_written = 0; /*when open,written data is zero*/
file->private_data = fdata;
+ put_vfscred(cred);
The get/put here only make sense if something else can modify the
credentials without it.
Otherwise, you can skip them since the reference count will always be >
0 because nothing else can change the current->vfscred pointer, and that
will contribute to the reference count.
What I'm trying to do is to design credentials in such a way that, even
with shared credentials, the get/put won't be necessary.
I'm also trying to put such credentials directly in task_struct so that
the code doesn't need to get a pointer from task_struct and then fetch
the credentials from the structure it points to.
The order of likelyhood of credential operations is assumed to be the
following:
1. Use/copy/local temporary modification of uid and gid
2. Use/copy/local temporary modification of groups
3. Permanent modification of something
* Local temporary modification means that the modification only has
effect on the current task and is revert before the end of the syscall
To optimize for this I propose to:
1. Put uid and gid directly in task_struct (optimize for 1)
2. Use copy-on-write on groups so that we avoid copying an big array
(optimize for 2.copy)
3. Change credentials only when not performing a syscall (optimize for 1
and 2)
> "changing fsuid/fsgid is *not* the common case that needs optimization."
I completely agree with this, that's the whole point!
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2002-09-01 21:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2002-08-31 16:32 [PATCH] Initial support for struct vfs_cred [0/1] Trond Myklebust
2002-08-31 18:57 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-08-31 19:36 ` Linus Torvalds
2002-08-31 19:38 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-08-31 22:30 ` Trond Myklebust
2002-08-31 23:13 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-09-01 13:03 ` Trond Myklebust
2002-09-01 14:10 ` Trond Myklebust
2002-09-01 14:20 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-09-01 16:40 ` Trond Myklebust
2002-09-01 18:54 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-09-01 19:40 ` Trond Myklebust
2002-09-01 21:34 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-09-01 21:56 ` Trond Myklebust
2002-09-01 22:50 ` Luca Barbieri
[not found] ` <20020903034607.GF29452@ravel.coda.cs.cmu.edu>
2002-09-08 22:04 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-09-09 6:22 ` Jan Harkes
2002-09-09 11:17 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-09-01 14:33 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-09-01 16:38 ` Trond Myklebust
2002-09-01 18:42 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-09-01 19:25 ` Trond Myklebust
2002-09-01 21:36 ` Luca Barbieri [this message]
2002-09-01 15:15 ` Daniel Phillips
2002-09-01 15:35 ` Luca Barbieri
2002-08-31 19:51 ` Luca Barbieri
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