From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7]
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 18:59:22 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <10454.1485889162@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu8dnKB1sRGb3U+XB1eoA7Eyo4qSFBtPRbvGV912xPViVw@mail.gmail.com>
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> > UEFI-2.6 adds a new variable, DeployedMode. If it exists, this must be 1
> > if we're to engage lockdown mode.
> >
> > Reported-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>
> Interestingly, the string 'DeployedMode' appears zero times in the
> EDK2 codebase, so I wonder if it makes any sense to merge this now.
> The string 'AuditMode' does appear once, but in a comment
It's in the standard, so shouldn't we check for it?
> In any case, the logic is not entirely correct either: apologies if it
> was me who caused any confusion here, but it seems DeployedMode could
> legally be 0 or 1 while secure boot is in fact enabled. It is actually
> AuditMode that should be taken into account here, i.e., if AuditMode
> == 1, the firmware ignores invalid or missing signatures. If
> SecureBoot == 0x1, SetupMode == 0x0 and AuditMode == 0x0 (or
> non-existent), signature verification is performed regardless of the
> value (or existence) of DeployedMode.
>
> So I propose to respin this patch to treat AuditMode == 0x1 as 'secure
> boot disabled', and ignore if it is missing.
Ummm... This might conflict what said:
| Since you seem to be using this to mean "is the platform locked down?",
| this looks to be no longer complete in the UEFI 2.6 world. If
| DeployedMode == 0, even if SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0, you can
| remove the platform key by writing 1 to AuditMode and gain control of
| the secure variables. The lock down state becomes DeployedMode == 1,
| SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0
|
| See the diagram on page 1817
|
| http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI%20Spec%202_6.pdf
Looking again at that diagram, should I be checking all four variables
(SecureBoot, SetupMode, DeployedMode and AuditMode)? And/or should I treat
audit mode differently to deployed mode?
Further, there doesn't seem to be a state in which SecureBoot is shown as
being 1.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-31 18:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-01-31 15:13 [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7] David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2017-01-31 17:37 ` kbuild test robot
2017-01-31 18:04 ` kbuild test robot
2017-02-02 21:34 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 " David Howells
2017-01-31 18:19 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 18:59 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-02-01 10:02 ` David Howells
2017-02-01 10:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 12:33 ` David Howells
2017-02-01 14:44 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-01 15:00 ` David Howells
2017-02-01 15:02 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02 21:36 ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-02 21:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() " David Howells
2017-02-03 16:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 16:21 ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:23 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 16:27 ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:29 ` David Howells
2017-02-03 16:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 17:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-03 17:19 ` David Howells
2017-01-31 16:45 ` [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel " Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 17:04 ` David Howells
2017-01-31 18:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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