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From: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Eric Lammerts <eric@lammerts.org>
Cc: Marc Ballarin <Ballarin.Marc@gmx.de>, Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
	albert@users.sourceforge.net,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: dynamic /dev security hole?
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 16:33:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1092065586.14144.31.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0408091203160.8353@vivaldi.madbase.net>

On Llu, 2004-08-09 at 17:17, Eric Lammerts wrote:
> It's only meant as a fix for the hardlink trick, not against the open
> file descriptor trick. About the latter, if someone still has the
> device opened, how can it go away? And if it doesn't go away, how can
> udev create a new node with the same major/minor?

User closes device
I have linked copy (not open)
Device unloaded
I open the linked copy
This makes new device load for me.


I'm just trying to point out that the order of operations matters here
because the old nodes must all be dead before the new device. Its even
worse for less dynamic numbering.

Alan


  reply	other threads:[~2004-08-09 16:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-08-08 12:47 dynamic /dev security hole? Albert Cahalan
2004-08-08 15:58 ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-08 15:04   ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-08 20:42     ` Greg KH
2004-08-08 16:21   ` Greg KH
2004-08-08 21:43     ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-08 22:07     ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-09  4:40       ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 13:30         ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 13:19           ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-09 16:54             ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 17:04               ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 17:14                 ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-10  0:21                   ` Greg KH
2004-08-11 17:12             ` [RFC, PATCH] sys_revoke(), just a try. (was: Re: dynamic /dev security hole?) Michael Buesch
2004-08-12 16:49               ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-12 19:51                 ` Alan Cox
2004-08-12 19:39                   ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-13 12:39                   ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 14:49         ` dynamic /dev security hole? Alan Cox
2004-08-09 16:17           ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 15:33             ` Alan Cox [this message]
2004-08-09 16:47               ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 17:54                 ` Alan Cox
2004-08-10  0:21       ` Greg KH

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