From: Gianni Tedesco <gianni@scaramanga.co.uk>
To: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton <lkcl@lkcl.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: fireflier firewall userspace program doing userspace packet filtering
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2004 20:16:06 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1093893366.7064.176.camel@sherbert> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20040830181519.GE8382@lkcl.net>
On Mon, 2004-08-30 at 19:15 +0100, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
> so, my question, therefore, is:
>
> what should i record in a modified version of ipt_owner in
> order to "vet" packets on a per-executable basis?
>
> should i consider recording the inode of the program's binary?
Bear in mind that that would make sense for an ACCEPT rule, but for a
DROP rule, copying the binary would bypass the check.
> should i consider recording the _name_ of the program?
And bear in mind any user can set the name (I assume you mean the argv
[0] here) of their process to whatever they like, and then use the
firewall rules for another program.
Maybe cryptographically checksumming all the executable file-backed maps
would be closer to what you want. This ensures that the code you "trust"
to do the right-thing(tm) on the network is the only code that can
generate/receive whatever traffic. That approach has it's own issues
though too.
> for example, i notice in ipt_owner.c that match_pid() calls
> find_task_by_pid(). okkkaaay... so... and then in fs/proc/base.c's
> proc_exe_link(), i see that get_task_mm() is called to get
> something called an mm_struct. and theeeennn... dget is called
> on _that_, and _then_ in struct dentry, there's something called
> a d_inode, and _that_ is what i presume contains the inode number
> of the running process (i_ino).
Firewalling on PID has rather obvious security ramifications, unless the
PID is 0 or 1.
> am i along the right lines, or should i be (according to
> proc_exe_link()) hunting down the struct vfsmount argument
> with mntget() instead? somehow i don't think so, but i haven't
> any point of reference to know in advance.
Using paths to exec'ed binaries has problems too, as we have per-process
namespaces etc..
I've seen no evidence that any existing firewall software has got this
functionality right thus far.
HTH.
--
// Gianni Tedesco (gianni at scaramanga dot co dot uk)
lynx --source www.scaramanga.co.uk/scaramanga.asc | gpg --import
8646BE7D: 6D9F 2287 870E A2C9 8F60 3A3C 91B5 7669 8646 BE7D
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2004-08-30 19:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2004-08-30 10:42 fireflier firewall userspace program doing userspace packet filtering Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-08-30 18:15 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-08-30 19:16 ` Gianni Tedesco [this message]
2004-08-30 20:00 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-08-31 9:27 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1093893366.7064.176.camel@sherbert \
--to=gianni@scaramanga.co.uk \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=lkcl@lkcl.net \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox