From: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@suse.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
torvalds@osdl.org, stable@kernel.org
Subject: Re: Linux 2.6.17.6
Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2006 02:20:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1153009253.12764.20.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1153009083.12764.18.camel@localhost>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 613 bytes --]
Hi Greg,
> > This should fix the reported issue of NetworkManager dying when using
> > the 2.6.17.5 kernel release. All users of the 2.6.17 kernel are
> > recommended to upgrade to this kernel, as it fixes a publicly known
> > security issue that can provide root access to any local user of the
> > machine.
>
> attached is the backported "don't allow chmod()" patch. Please consider
> including it into the next stable release. Since the 2.6.17.6 kernel is
> no longer vulnerable against CVE-2006-3626, this has no real urgent need
> to get out.
actually attaching the patch might help ;)
Regards
Marcel
[-- Attachment #2: patch-dont-allow-chmod-on-proc --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 3947 bytes --]
Don't allow chmod() on the /proc/<pid>/ files
This just turns off chmod() on the /proc/<pid>/ files, since there is no
good reason to allow it, and had we disallowed it originally, the nasty
/proc race exploit wouldn't have been possible.
The other patches already fixed the problem chmod() could cause, so this
is really just some final mop-up..
This particular version is based off a patch by Eugene and Marcel which
had much better naming than my original equivalent one.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
---
commit 5aa433ab7de5110cc76d19763e2e6424279bcf79
tree 51ce3e286807c56567eb05ec835e7c3d84f42eba
parent 245b3c810f1d09ac27f326346cb58451556ecc0b
author Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Sun, 16 Jul 2006 02:13:16 +0200
committer Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Sun, 16 Jul 2006 02:13:16 +0200
fs/proc/base.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index f801693..a3b825f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -596,6 +596,27 @@ static int proc_permission(struct inode
return proc_check_root(inode);
}
+static int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+{
+ int error;
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+
+ if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
+ if (!error) {
+ error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
+ if (!error)
+ error = inode_setattr(inode, attr);
+ }
+ return error;
+}
+
+static struct inode_operations proc_def_inode_operations = {
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
+};
+
static int proc_task_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct dentry *root;
@@ -987,6 +1008,7 @@ static struct file_operations proc_oom_a
static struct inode_operations proc_mem_inode_operations = {
.permission = proc_permission,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
@@ -1184,7 +1206,8 @@ out:
static struct inode_operations proc_pid_link_inode_operations = {
.readlink = proc_pid_readlink,
- .follow_link = proc_pid_follow_link
+ .follow_link = proc_pid_follow_link,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
};
#define NUMBUF 10
@@ -1356,6 +1379,7 @@ static struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode
ei->task = NULL;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
inode->i_ino = fake_ino(task->pid, ino);
+ inode->i_op = &proc_def_inode_operations;
if (!pid_alive(task))
goto out_unlock;
@@ -1579,11 +1603,13 @@ static struct file_operations proc_task_
static struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_lookupfd,
.permission = proc_permission,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
};
static struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_task_lookup,
.permission = proc_task_permission,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
@@ -1873,10 +1899,12 @@ static struct file_operations proc_tid_b
static struct inode_operations proc_tgid_base_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_tgid_base_lookup,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
};
static struct inode_operations proc_tid_base_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_tid_base_lookup,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
@@ -1918,10 +1946,12 @@ static struct dentry *proc_tid_attr_look
static struct inode_operations proc_tgid_attr_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_tgid_attr_lookup,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
};
static struct inode_operations proc_tid_attr_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_tid_attr_lookup,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
};
#endif
@@ -1946,6 +1976,7 @@ static void *proc_self_follow_link(struc
static struct inode_operations proc_self_inode_operations = {
.readlink = proc_self_readlink,
.follow_link = proc_self_follow_link,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
};
/**
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-07-16 0:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-07-15 19:35 Linux 2.6.17.6 Greg KH
2006-07-15 19:36 ` Greg KH
2006-07-16 0:18 ` Marcel Holtmann
2006-07-16 0:20 ` Marcel Holtmann [this message]
2006-08-03 7:19 ` [stable] " Greg KH
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