From: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: David Madore <david.madore@ens.fr>
Cc: Linux Kernel mailing-list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM mailing-list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 3/4: introduce new capabilities
Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2006 17:23:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1157905393.23085.5.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20060910134257.GC12086@clipper.ens.fr>
Ar Sul, 2006-09-10 am 15:42 +0200, ysgrifennodd David Madore:
> Introduce six new "regular" (=on-by-default) capabilities:
>
> * CAP_REG_FORK, CAP_REG_OPEN, CAP_REG_EXEC allow access to the
> fork(), open() and exec() syscalls,
CAP_REG_EXEC seems meaningless, I can do the same with mmap by hand for
most types of binary execution except setuid (which is separate it
seems)
Given the capability model is accepted as inferior to things like
SELinux policies why do we actually want to fix this anyway. It's
unfortunate we can't discard the existing capabilities model (which has
flaws) as well really.
Alan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-09-10 16:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-09-10 13:37 [PATCH 1/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 1/4: enlarge capability sets David Madore
2006-09-10 13:41 ` [PATCH 2/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 2/4: change inheritance semantics David Madore
2006-09-10 13:42 ` [PATCH 3/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 3/4: introduce new capabilities David Madore
2006-09-10 16:23 ` Alan Cox [this message]
2006-09-10 16:09 ` David Madore
2006-09-11 8:06 ` James Morris
2006-09-11 12:03 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-11 16:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2006-09-17 18:06 ` Pavel Machek
2006-09-10 17:56 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-10 20:03 ` David Madore
2006-09-11 6:10 ` Jan Engelhardt
2006-09-11 6:51 ` David Madore
2006-09-11 13:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-09-17 18:14 ` Pavel Machek
2006-09-17 20:39 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-17 21:16 ` David Madore
2006-09-18 11:46 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-18 11:58 ` David Madore
2006-09-18 12:04 ` Pavel Machek
2006-09-18 12:12 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-18 16:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2006-09-19 0:25 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-19 3:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2006-09-19 4:09 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-19 15:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2006-09-19 18:27 ` Pavel Machek
2006-09-10 13:44 ` David Madore
2006-09-10 13:46 ` [PATCH 4/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 4/4: add filesystem support David Madore
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