From: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, hch@infradead.org, serue@us.ibm.com,
viro@ftp.linux.org.uk, ebiederm@xmission.com, kzak@redhat.com,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.osdl.org,
util-linux-ng@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 3/9] unprivileged mounts: account user mounts
Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2008 10:18:47 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1199816327.9834.63.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080108113623.446872155@szeredi.hu>
On Tue, 2008-01-08 at 12:35 +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> plain text document attachment
> (unprivileged-mounts-account-user-mounts.patch)
> From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
>
> Add sysctl variables for accounting and limiting the number of user
> mounts.
...
> +int nr_user_mounts;
> +int max_user_mounts = 1024;
Just from a containers point of view, I think this is something we'll
need to fix up in the near future if it stays in the current form.
Instead of having a global tracking, perhaps we could have a per-user
limit tracked in 'struct user'. The plans are to ensure that two
containers' users "dave" each have a different 'struct user', so that
seems to be a decent place to track it.
Also, is a read-only sysctl really the best way to get the number of
user mounts back out of the kernel? What would you use it for?
Do you need any special logic for setting 'max_user_mounts' in the case
where it gets set _below_ 'nr_user_mounts'?
> /* /sys/fs */
> struct kobject *fs_kobj;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fs_kobj);
> @@ -477,11 +480,30 @@ static struct vfsmount *skip_mnt_tree(st
> return p;
> }
>
> +static void dec_nr_user_mounts(void)
> +{
> + spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
> + nr_user_mounts--;
> + spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
> +}
> +
> static void set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> {
> BUG_ON(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_USER);
> mnt->mnt_uid = current->fsuid;
> mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_USER;
> + spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
> + nr_user_mounts++;
> + spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
> +}
One little nitpick on the patch layout: It's a wee bit difficult to
audit how the set function is used vs the clear one when its users don't
come until the later patches. It might be worth introducing the users
here, too.
> +static void clear_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> +{
> + if (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_USER) {
> + mnt->mnt_uid = 0;
> + mnt->mnt_flags &= ~MNT_USER;
> + dec_nr_user_mounts();
> + }
> }
>
> static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct vfsmount *old, struct dentry *root,
> @@ -542,6 +564,7 @@ static inline void __mntput(struct vfsmo
> */
> WARN_ON(atomic_read(&mnt->__mnt_writers));
> dput(mnt->mnt_root);
> + clear_mnt_user(mnt);
> free_vfsmnt(mnt);
> deactivate_super(sb);
> }
> @@ -1306,6 +1329,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct nameidata *
> else
> err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
> if (!err) {
> + clear_mnt_user(nd->path.mnt);
> nd->path.mnt->mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
> if (flags & MS_SETUSER)
> set_mnt_user(nd->path.mnt);
> Index: linux/include/linux/fs.h
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/include/linux/fs.h 2008-01-03 20:52:38.000000000 +0100
> +++ linux/include/linux/fs.h 2008-01-03 21:15:35.000000000 +0100
> @@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ extern struct inodes_stat_t inodes_stat;
>
> extern int leases_enable, lease_break_time;
>
> +extern int nr_user_mounts;
> +extern int max_user_mounts;
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_DNOTIFY
> extern int dir_notify_enable;
> #endif
> Index: linux/kernel/sysctl.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/kernel/sysctl.c 2008-01-03 17:13:22.000000000 +0100
> +++ linux/kernel/sysctl.c 2008-01-03 21:15:35.000000000 +0100
> @@ -1288,6 +1288,22 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
> #endif
> #endif
> {
> + .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
> + .procname = "nr_user_mounts",
> + .data = &nr_user_mounts,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> + .mode = 0444,
> + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
> + },
> + {
> + .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
> + .procname = "max_user_mounts",
> + .data = &max_user_mounts,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> + .mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
> + },
> + {
> .ctl_name = KERN_SETUID_DUMPABLE,
> .procname = "suid_dumpable",
> .data = &suid_dumpable,
>
> --
> _______________________________________________
> Containers mailing list
> Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
> https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
-- Dave
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-01-08 18:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-01-08 11:35 [patch 0/9] mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall (v6) Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 11:35 ` [patch 1/9] unprivileged mounts: add user mounts to the kernel Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 21:34 ` Pavel Machek
2008-01-08 21:47 ` Pavel Machek
2008-01-14 21:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-08 11:35 ` [patch 2/9] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged umount Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-14 21:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-08 11:35 ` [patch 3/9] unprivileged mounts: account user mounts Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 18:18 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2008-01-08 19:18 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-14 21:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-08 11:35 ` [patch 4/9] unprivileged mounts: propagate error values from clone_mnt Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-14 22:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-15 10:15 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 11:35 ` [patch 5/9] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged bind mounts Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 18:12 ` Dave Hansen
2008-01-08 19:08 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 19:15 ` Dave Hansen
2008-01-08 20:44 ` Szabolcs Szakacsits
2008-01-09 12:45 ` Jan Engelhardt
2008-01-09 13:26 ` Karel Zak
2008-01-09 13:32 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 18:26 ` Dave Hansen
2008-01-08 19:21 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-10 4:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-14 22:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-08 11:35 ` [patch 6/9] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged mounts Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-09 11:11 ` Karel Zak
2008-01-09 12:41 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-14 22:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-08 11:35 ` [patch 7/9] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged fuse mounts Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 21:46 ` Pavel Machek
2008-01-08 22:42 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 22:58 ` Pavel Machek
2008-01-09 9:11 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-09 11:33 ` Pavel Machek
2008-01-09 13:16 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-09 13:35 ` Pavel Machek
2008-01-09 13:48 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-09 14:00 ` Pavel Machek
2008-01-09 14:14 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-08 23:56 ` Nigel Cunningham
2008-01-09 8:47 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-09 9:29 ` Nigel Cunningham
2008-01-09 11:12 ` Pavel Machek
2008-01-09 9:19 ` Szabolcs Szakacsits
2008-01-14 23:24 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-15 10:29 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-15 13:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-08 11:35 ` [patch 8/9] unprivileged mounts: propagation: inherit owner from parent Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-14 23:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-15 10:39 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-15 14:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-15 14:37 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-15 14:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-08 11:35 ` [patch 9/9] unprivileged mounts: add "no submounts" flag Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-14 23:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-15 10:41 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-15 10:53 ` A. C. Censi
2008-01-15 10:58 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-15 13:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-16 9:43 ` Miklos Szeredi
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1199816327.9834.63.camel@localhost \
--to=haveblue@us.ibm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=containers@lists.osdl.org \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=hch@infradead.org \
--cc=kzak@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
--cc=serue@us.ibm.com \
--cc=util-linux-ng@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=viro@ftp.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox