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From: "Heusden van, FJJ (Folkert)" <F.J.J.Heusden@rn.rabobank.nl>
To: "Tomas Szepe" <szepe@pinerecords.com>,
	"Heusden van, FJJ (Folkert)" <F.J.J.Heusden@rn.rabobank.nl>
Cc: "Roy Sigurd Karlsbakk" <roy@karlsbakk.net>,
	"Linux Kernel Development" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: random PID patch
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 11:20:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <11D18CF11074110-971@_rabobank.nl_> (raw)

> Sometimes, (well; frequently) programs that create temporary
> files let the filename depend on their PID. A hacker could use
> that knowledge. So if you know that the application that
> you're starting uses the last PID+1, you could make sure that
> that file already exists or create a symlink with that name or
> whatsoever causing the application you're starting to do
> things it's not supposed to. Like forcing suid apps to create
> a file in the startup-scripts dir. or something.
TS> How about I create 2^15 symlinks then?
TS> Really, the only true solution to this problem is to fix the apps.

True. But until ALL applications are fixed and until this bug is no
longer written, this patch can help...

I agree, though,  that it should not be implemented in the main-
kernel. Still, it can be usefull.


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             reply	other threads:[~2002-11-11 10:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2002-11-11 10:20 Heusden van, FJJ (Folkert) [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2002-11-11 10:14 random PID patch Grzegorz Jaskiewicz
2002-11-11 10:12 Heusden van, FJJ (Folkert)
2002-11-11 10:17 ` Tomas Szepe
2002-11-11 13:10 ` Alan Cox
2002-11-12 17:42   ` Pavel Machek
2002-11-11  8:40 Heusden van, FJJ (Folkert)
2002-11-11  9:57 ` Roy Sigurd Karlsbakk

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