Re: [PATCH 3/4] integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider

Andrew Morton
2008-11-14T22:16:40Z

On Wed, 12 Nov 2008 22:47:13 -0500
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> This is a re-release of Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA) as an
> independent Linunx Integrity Module(LIM) service provider.
>
> As a LIM integrity provider, IMA implements the new LIM must_measure(),
> collect_measurement(), store_measurement(), and display_template() API
> calls. The store_measurement() call supports two types of data, IMA
> (i.e. file data) and generic template data.
>
> IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for both
> files and other types of template measurements. As the Trusted Computing
> (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed
> in any way (on the bprm_check_integrity, nameidata_check_integrity,
> file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. In addition,
> IMA maintains a list of these hash values, which can be used to validate
> the aggregate PCR value. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus
> the system can prove to itself and to a third party these measurements
> in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software.
>
> When store_measurement() is called for the IMA type of data, the file
> measurement and the file name hint are used to form an IMA template.
> IMA then calculates the IMA template measurement(hash) and submits it
> to the TPM chip for inclusion in one of the chip's Platform Configuration
> Registers (PCR).
>
> When store_measurement() is called for generic template data, IMA
> calculates the measurement(hash) of the template data, and submits
> the template measurement to the TPM chip for inclusion in one of the
> chip's Platform Configuration Registers(PCR).
>
> In order to view the contents of template data through securityfs, the
> template_display() function must be defined in the registered
> template_operations. In the case of the IMA template, the list of
> file names and files hashes submitted can be viewed through securityfs.
>
> As mentioned above, IMA maintains a list of hash values of executables
> and other sensitive system files loaded into the run-time of the system.
> Our work has shown that requests for integrity appraisal and measurement
> need to be based on knowledge of the filesystem, requiring the system
> to either be labeled with integrity data or depend on the existent LSM
> security labels. The previous set of integrity patches modified the LSM
> modules to be integrity context aware, meaning that the LSM modules made
> integrity data/metadata appraisal and measurement API calls based on
> an understanding of the LSM security labels. Both of the LSM maintainers
> felt that the changes were too intrusive and that integrity enforcement
> should be made by the integrity provider, not the LSM module.
>
> To address these concerns, Stephen Smalley suggested using the
> security_audit_rule_match(), renamed to security_filter_rule_match(), to
> define LSM specific integrity measurement policy rules, in lieu of
> modifying the LSM modules. In the current set of patches, the integrity
> API calls can be made either by IMA, based on an LSM specific integrity
> policy, or by an integrity context aware LSM.
>
> ...
>
> +static void ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
> +{
> + /* cumulative sha1 over tpm registers 0-7 */
> + struct ima_measure_entry *entry;
> + size_t count;
> + int err;
> +
> + /* create new entry for boot aggregate */
> + entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);

This uses GFP_ATOMIC, but crypto_alloc_hash() (called later) uses
GFP_KERNEL.

If this _had_ to be GFP_ATOMIC then you have a bug.

Otherwise, please use the much more reliable GFP_KERNEL here.