From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1763780AbZEGWcH (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 May 2009 18:32:07 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1763171AbZEGW1T (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 May 2009 18:27:19 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com ([134.134.136.21]:35559 "EHLO orsmga101.jf.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757096AbZEGW1J (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 May 2009 18:27:09 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.40,312,1239001200"; d="scan'208";a="410470480" From: "H. Peter Anvin" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com, hbabu@us.ibm.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, ying.huang@intel.com, mingo@elte.hu, tglx@linutronix.de, ebiederm@xmission.com, sam@ravnborg.org, "H. Peter Anvin" Subject: [PATCH 12/14] x86, boot: zero EFLAGS on 32 bits Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 15:27:00 -0700 Message-Id: <1241735222-6640-13-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.6.0.6 In-Reply-To: <1241735222-6640-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com> References: <1241735222-6640-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: H. Peter Anvin The 64-bit code already clears EFLAGS as soon as it has a stack. This seems like a reasonable precaution, so do it on 32 bits as well. [ Impact: extra paranoia ] Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 10 ++++++++-- 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S index 47636b3..48c2047 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S @@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ * the page directory. [According to comments etc elsewhere on a compressed * kernel it will end up at 0x1000 + 1Mb I hope so as I assume this. - AC] * - * Page 0 is deliberately kept safe, since System Management Mode code in + * Page 0 is deliberately kept safe, since System Management Mode code in * laptops may need to access the BIOS data stored there. This is also - * useful for future device drivers that either access the BIOS via VM86 + * useful for future device drivers that either access the BIOS via VM86 * mode. */ @@ -84,6 +84,12 @@ ENTRY(startup_32) leal boot_stack_end(%ebx), %esp /* + * Zero EFLAGS + */ + pushl $0 + popfl + +/* * Copy the compressed kernel to the end of our buffer * where decompression in place becomes safe. */ -- 1.6.0.6