From: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jwboyer@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 18:37:43 -0400 (EDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1241952070.8587861.1377729463830.JavaMail.root@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1376933171-9854-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
----- Original Message -----
> From: "Matthew Garrett" <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jwboyer@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org
> Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 1:26:01 PM
> Subject: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted
>
> We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling
> it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted
> key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to
> relax the restrictions.
>
> However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to
> modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to
> reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering
> the existing restrictions useless.
>
> This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points
> that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement
> of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the
> kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically
> enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger
> guarantee of kernel integrity.
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>
Did you purposely exclude similar checks for hibernate that were covered
by earlier versions of your patch set?
I think you should include it and any patch set that attempts to add support
for doing hibernate securely would make appropriate changes.
-Lenny.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-28 22:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-19 17:26 [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 01/10] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 15:01 ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 02/10] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 03/10] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 04/10] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 05/10] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 06/10] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 07/10] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 15:57 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-29 18:14 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-29 18:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 09/10] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 10/10] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 18:37 ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-30 20:46 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-30 23:41 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 10:51 ` joeyli
2013-09-04 12:01 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 13:13 ` joeyli
2013-08-19 17:34 ` [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted Kees Cook
2013-08-28 22:37 ` Lenny Szubowicz [this message]
2013-08-28 22:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 22:58 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-28 23:05 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 23:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-28 23:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-02 5:22 ` joeyli
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1241952070.8587861.1377729463830.JavaMail.root@redhat.com \
--to=lszubowi@redhat.com \
--cc=jwboyer@redhat.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox