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* [PATCH] kmsg: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
@ 2013-02-22 18:18 Josh Boyer
  2013-02-27 17:54 ` Kees Cook
  2013-02-27 18:05 ` [PATCH] " Kees Cook
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Josh Boyer @ 2013-02-22 18:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds
  Cc: eparis, Christian Kujau, stable, linux-kernel

Originally, the addition of dmesg_restrict covered both the syslog
method of accessing dmesg, as well as /dev/kmsg itself.  This was done
indirectly by security_syslog calling cap_syslog before doing any LSM
checks.

However, commit 12b3052c3ee (capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog
logic to fix build failure) moved the code around and pushed the checks
into the caller itself.  That seems to have inadvertently dropped the
checks for dmesg_restrict on /dev/kmsg.  Most people haven't noticed
because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the syslog method for
access in older versions.  With util-linux 2.22 and a kernel newer than
3.5, dmesg(1) defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.

Fix this by making an explicit check in the devkmsg_open function.

This fixes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192

Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/printk.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c
index f24633a..398ef9a 100644
--- a/kernel/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk.c
@@ -615,6 +615,9 @@ static int devkmsg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	struct devkmsg_user *user;
 	int err;
 
+	if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	/* write-only does not need any file context */
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY)
 		return 0;
-- 
1.8.1.2


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
@ 2013-04-30 17:25 Kees Cook
  2013-04-30 18:35 ` Josh Boyer
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2013-04-30 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Linus Torvalds, Josh Boyer, Kay Sievers, linux-kernel, Eric Paris,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman, Randy Dunlap, Steven Rostedt, Kees Cook

To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they allow:

- /proc/kmsg allows:
 - open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
   single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
 - everything, after an open.

- syslog syscall allows:
 - anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
 - SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if dmesg_restrict==0.
 - nothing else (EPERM).

The use-cases were:
- dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
- sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
  destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.

AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
clear the ring buffer.

Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e. SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR),
so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive syslog syscall actions.

To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the constants
to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and
SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC). SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows
non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC allows destructive actions
after a capabilities-constrained SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.

- /dev/kmsg allows:
 - open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
 - reading/polling, after open

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 fs/proc/kmsg.c         |   10 +++---
 include/linux/syslog.h |    4 +--
 kernel/printk.c        |   91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/kmsg.c b/fs/proc/kmsg.c
index bd4b5a7..bdfabda 100644
--- a/fs/proc/kmsg.c
+++ b/fs/proc/kmsg.c
@@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ extern wait_queue_head_t log_wait;
 
 static int kmsg_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
 {
-	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
+	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
 }
 
 static int kmsg_release(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
 {
-	(void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
+	(void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ static ssize_t kmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) &&
-	    !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE))
+	    !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC))
 		return -EAGAIN;
-	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
+	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
 }
 
 static unsigned int kmsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
 	poll_wait(file, &log_wait, wait);
-	if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE))
+	if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC))
 		return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/syslog.h b/include/linux/syslog.h
index 3891139..98a3153 100644
--- a/include/linux/syslog.h
+++ b/include/linux/syslog.h
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@
 /* Return size of the log buffer */
 #define SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER   10
 
-#define SYSLOG_FROM_CALL 0
-#define SYSLOG_FROM_FILE 1
+#define SYSLOG_FROM_READER           0
+#define SYSLOG_FROM_PROC             1
 
 int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int count, bool from_file);
 
diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c
index abbdd9e..53b5c5e 100644
--- a/kernel/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk.c
@@ -368,6 +368,53 @@ static void log_store(int facility, int level,
 	log_next_seq++;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+int dmesg_restrict = 1;
+#else
+int dmesg_restrict;
+#endif
+
+static int syslog_action_restricted(int type)
+{
+	if (dmesg_restrict)
+		return 1;
+	/*
+	 * Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size"
+	 * for everybody.
+	 */
+	return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
+	       type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER;
+}
+
+static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
+	 * already done the capabilities checks at open time.
+	 */
+	if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
+		if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
+			return 0;
+		/*
+		 * For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with
+		 * a warning.
+		 */
+		if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
+				 "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
+				 "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n",
+				 current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+			return 0;
+		}
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+	return security_syslog(type);
+}
+
+
 /* /dev/kmsg - userspace message inject/listen interface */
 struct devkmsg_user {
 	u64 seq;
@@ -624,7 +671,8 @@ static int devkmsg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY)
 		return 0;
 
-	err = security_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL);
+	err = check_syslog_permissions(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL,
+				       SYSLOG_FROM_READER);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -817,45 +865,6 @@ static inline void boot_delay_msec(int level)
 }
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
-int dmesg_restrict = 1;
-#else
-int dmesg_restrict;
-#endif
-
-static int syslog_action_restricted(int type)
-{
-	if (dmesg_restrict)
-		return 1;
-	/* Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" for everybody */
-	return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER;
-}
-
-static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
-{
-	/*
-	 * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
-	 * already done the capabilities checks at open time.
-	 */
-	if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
-		if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
-			return 0;
-		/* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a warning */
-		if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
-			printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
-				 "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
-				 "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n",
-				 current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
-			return 0;
-		}
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
 #if defined(CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME)
 static bool printk_time = 1;
 #else
@@ -1253,7 +1262,7 @@ out:
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len)
 {
-	return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_CALL);
+	return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_READER);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
1.7.9.5


-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2013-05-08 21:32 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2013-02-22 18:18 [PATCH] kmsg: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg Josh Boyer
2013-02-27 17:54 ` Kees Cook
2013-02-27 18:01   ` Josh Boyer
2013-02-27 18:14     ` Kees Cook
2013-02-27 20:46       ` Eric Paris
2013-02-27 22:19         ` Josh Boyer
2013-02-27 22:34           ` Kees Cook
2013-03-22 21:54             ` Andrew Morton
2013-03-22 22:14               ` Josh Boyer
2013-04-01 23:51                 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-02  1:05                   ` Josh Boyer
2013-04-08 21:34                     ` Kees Cook
2013-04-09  0:50                       ` Josh Boyer
2013-04-09 15:48                         ` [PATCH v2] " Josh Boyer
2013-04-09 16:33                           ` Kees Cook
2013-04-24 17:44                             ` Kay Sievers
2013-04-24 17:58                               ` Josh Boyer
2013-04-24 19:50                                 ` Josh Boyer
2013-04-24 20:35                                 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-24 21:21                                   ` Josh Boyer
2013-04-24 21:36                                     ` Kees Cook
2013-04-24 21:51                                       ` Josh Boyer
2013-04-24 23:52                                         ` Kay Sievers
2013-04-24 21:30                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-04-24 21:41                                     ` Kees Cook
2013-04-24 22:01                                     ` Josh Boyer
2013-04-24 17:43                           ` Josh Boyer
2013-02-27 18:05 ` [PATCH] " Kees Cook
2013-02-27 18:13   ` Josh Boyer
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2013-04-30 17:25 [PATCH] kmsg: honor " Kees Cook
2013-04-30 18:35 ` Josh Boyer
2013-04-30 18:54   ` Kees Cook
2013-05-07 16:27 ` Josh Boyer
2013-05-08 21:22 ` Andrew Morton
2013-05-08 21:26   ` Kees Cook
2013-05-08 21:32     ` Steven Rostedt

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