From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/14] fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2010 17:49:50 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1271886594-3719-11-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1271886594-3719-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
After creating the initial LSM security extended attribute, call
evm_inode_post_init_security() to create the 'security.evm'
extended attribute.
(Support for other fs still needed.)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
diff --git a/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c b/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c
index c815584..3987a1b 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "xattr.h"
static size_t
@@ -49,21 +50,37 @@ int
ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
{
int err;
- size_t len;
- void *value;
- char *name;
+ struct xattr lsm_xattr;
+ struct xattr evm_xattr;
- err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+ err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &lsm_xattr.name,
+ &lsm_xattr.value,
+ &lsm_xattr.value_len);
if (err) {
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return 0;
return err;
}
err = ext2_xattr_set(inode, EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
- name, value, len, 0);
- kfree(name);
- kfree(value);
+ lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
+ lsm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = evm_inode_post_init_security(inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = ext2_xattr_set(inode, EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
+ evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
+ evm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ kfree(evm_xattr.value);
+out:
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
+ if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return 0;
return err;
+
}
struct xattr_handler ext2_xattr_security_handler = {
diff --git a/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c b/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c
index 4743487..eba57a9 100644
--- a/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/ext3_jbd.h>
#include <linux/ext3_fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "xattr.h"
static size_t
@@ -51,20 +52,35 @@ int
ext3_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
{
int err;
- size_t len;
- void *value;
- char *name;
+ struct xattr lsm_xattr;
+ struct xattr evm_xattr;
- err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+ err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &lsm_xattr.name,
+ &lsm_xattr.value,
+ &lsm_xattr.value_len);
if (err) {
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return 0;
return err;
}
err = ext3_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
- name, value, len, 0);
- kfree(name);
- kfree(value);
+ lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
+ lsm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = evm_inode_post_init_security(inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = ext3_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
+ evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
+ evm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ kfree(evm_xattr.value);
+out:
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
+ if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return 0;
return err;
}
diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c b/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c
index 983c253..d8ecbee 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "ext4_jbd2.h"
#include "ext4.h"
#include "xattr.h"
@@ -51,20 +52,35 @@ int
ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
{
int err;
- size_t len;
- void *value;
- char *name;
+ struct xattr lsm_xattr;
+ struct xattr evm_xattr;
- err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+ err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &lsm_xattr.name,
+ &lsm_xattr.value,
+ &lsm_xattr.value_len);
if (err) {
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return 0;
return err;
}
err = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
- name, value, len, 0);
- kfree(name);
- kfree(value);
+ lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
+ lsm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = evm_inode_post_init_security(inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
+ evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
+ evm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ kfree(evm_xattr.value);
+out:
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
+ if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return 0;
return err;
}
--
1.6.6.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-04-21 21:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-04-21 21:49 [PATCH 00/14] EVM Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 01/14] integrity: move ima inode integrity data management Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 02/14] security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 03/14] xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp Mimi Zohar
2010-04-26 18:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 04/14] evm: re-release Mimi Zohar
2010-04-26 21:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-06-04 14:28 ` Stephen Smalley
2010-06-04 14:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-06-04 15:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2010-06-04 18:08 ` David Safford
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 05/14] ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 06/14] security: imbed evm calls in security hooks Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 07/14] evm: inode post removexattr Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 08/14] evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 09/14] evm: inode_post_init Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 11/14] ima: integrity appraisal extension Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 12/14] ima: appraise default rules Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 13/14] ima: inode post_setattr Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:49 ` [PATCH 14/14] ima: add ima_inode_setxattr and ima_inode_removexattr Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 21:58 ` [PATCH 00/14] EVM Randy Dunlap
2010-04-21 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-04-21 22:23 ` Randy Dunlap
2010-04-21 22:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-05-31 0:20 ` James Morris
2010-05-31 10:02 ` Shaz
2010-05-31 10:08 ` Shaz
2010-06-01 19:28 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-06-02 7:03 ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2010-06-02 7:50 ` Shaz
2010-06-02 9:12 ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2010-06-02 10:15 ` Shaz
2010-06-02 10:23 ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2010-06-02 14:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-06-04 6:53 ` Shaz
2010-06-04 15:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-06-04 18:47 ` Shaz
2010-06-04 0:57 ` James Morris
2010-06-04 6:56 ` Shaz
2010-06-04 20:25 ` [ProbableSpam] " David Safford
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