From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fs: block cross-uid sticky symlinks
Date: Tue, 01 Jun 2010 11:34:37 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1275406477.2690.56.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20100601145251.GP4098@outflux.net>
On Tue, 2010-06-01 at 07:52 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 01, 2010 at 07:55:02AM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> > On Tue, 2010-06-01 at 03:55 -0400, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > > On Mon, May 31, 2010 at 08:24:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > > > My rationale is that if it's in commoncaps, it's effective for everyone, so
> > > > it might as well be in core VFS. If the VFS objections really do boil down
> > > > to "not in fs/" then I'm curious if doing this in commoncaps is acceptable.
> > >
> > > If you think the objection is about having things in fs/ you're smoking
> > > some really bad stuff.
> >
> > Sounds to me like we should probably follow the same path as
> > mmap_min_addr. We should add these hooks right in the VFS where they
> > belong (much like mmap_min_addr hooks into the vm) and control them 2
> > ways.
> >
> > 1) a Kconfig so distros can choose to turn it on or off by default
> > 2) a /proc interface so root can turn it off
> >
> > Nothing about that precludes additional similar checks inside an LSM
> > (like CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) which can be more finely controlled. So
> > maybe we want to follow up with the core VFS check with new checks in
> > SELinux (and maybe apparmour). This allows the user to disable the
> > general check and still be provided with some modicum of protection.
> > You might ask why not ONLY do the check in SELinux and drop the generic
> > check, but we have seen with mmap_min_addr that the SELinux unconfined
> > user can do damn well anything it wants to, so having a non-LSM version
> > of appropriate security checks is highly regarded.
>
> Would a CONFIG for this be overkill? mmap_min_addr is a little different
> in that there was desire to control a bottom limit on it, etc. Given this
> is either "on" or "off", I think just a sysctl is needed?
Seems like one of Alan's main arguments is that you should not turn it
on 'by default.' I assume most distros will want it on by default.
Alan made the same argument against mmap_min_addr (known to break dos
emu) but I think most major distros have it on by default these days
even if it does break those weird obscure use cases. I guess distros
can do it through sysctl but Fedora, at least, likes to keep those
default if possible, which is why I suggested the CONFIG. In any case,
putting this right square in the VFS where it happens makes the most
sense to me.
I'd also like to point out that I don't buy the argument that per
user /tmp/ is a 'better' solution for the general case. Any application
that would be broken by this change will also be broken by per
user /tmp. Now, if we used filesystem namespaces regularly for years
and users, administrators, and developers dealt with them often I agree
that would probably be the preferred solution. It would solve this
issue, but in introduces a whole host of other problems that are even
more obvious and even likely to bite people.
I probably would move the security hook down into __do_follow_link and
put this check down there as well, but I think you still have a problem
with d_parent. I don't see what keeps d_parent from being freed while
you are using it....
-Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-06-01 15:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-05-31 3:04 [PATCH v2] fs: block cross-uid sticky symlinks Kees Cook
2010-05-31 3:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-05-31 4:12 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 3:54 ` Eric Paris
2010-05-31 4:23 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 10:23 ` Alan Cox
2010-05-31 17:50 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 18:09 ` Alan Cox
2010-05-31 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 19:52 ` Al Viro
2010-05-31 22:00 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 19:27 ` Al Viro
2010-05-31 10:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2010-05-31 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 23:09 ` James Morris
2010-06-01 3:24 ` Kees Cook
2010-06-01 7:55 ` Christoph Hellwig
2010-06-01 11:55 ` Eric Paris
2010-06-01 14:52 ` Kees Cook
2010-06-01 15:34 ` Eric Paris [this message]
2010-06-01 17:31 ` tytso
2010-06-01 15:00 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 10:47 ` tytso
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