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From: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
To: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	keyrings@linux-nfs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Trusted and Encrypted Keys: fix up TSS_rawhmac() so we always kfree() and remember to call va_end()
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2011 08:28:02 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1295011682.7804.2.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1101132100190.11347@swampdragon.chaosbits.net>

On Thu, 2011-01-13 at 21:07 +0100, Jesper Juhl wrote:
> In security/keys/trusted_defined.c::TSS_rawhmac() we may leak the storage 
> allocated to 'sdesc' if
>   data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
> results in a NULL 'data' and we then leave the function by returning 
> -EINVAL. We also neglect calling va_end(argp) in that case and furthermore 
> we neglect va_end(argp) if
>   ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
> results in ret being negative and we then jump to the 'out' label.
> 
> I believe this patch takes care of these issues. Please review and 
> consider for inclusion.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>

thanks for catching this.

Acked-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>

> ---
>  trusted_defined.c |    8 +++++---
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
>   compile tested only.
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
> index 975e9f2..0ec7ab8 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
> @@ -101,16 +101,18 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
>  		if (dlen == 0)
>  			break;
>  		data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
> -		if (data == NULL)
> -			return -EINVAL;
> +		if (data == NULL) {
> +			ret = -EINVAL;
> +			goto out;
> +		}
>  		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
>  		if (ret < 0)
>  			goto out;
>  	}
> -	va_end(argp);
>  	if (!ret)
>  		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
>  out:
> +	va_end(argp);
>  	kfree(sdesc);
>  	return ret;
>  }
> 
> 
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2011-01-14 13:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-01-13 20:07 [PATCH] Trusted and Encrypted Keys: fix up TSS_rawhmac() so we always kfree() and remember to call va_end() Jesper Juhl
2011-01-14 13:28 ` David Safford [this message]
2011-01-14 13:45   ` [PATCH] Trusted and Encrypted Keys: fix up TSS_rawhmac() so wealways " Tetsuo Handa
2011-01-14 14:07     ` Tetsuo Handa
2011-01-15  0:58       ` Tetsuo Handa
2011-01-16 14:04       ` Jesper Juhl
2011-01-17  0:39         ` [PATCH 1/3] trusted-keys: another free memory bugfix Tetsuo Handa
2011-01-17  0:41           ` [PATCH 2/3] trusted-keys: check for NULL before using it Tetsuo Handa
2011-01-17  0:44             ` [PATCH 3/3] trusted-keys: avoid scattring va_end() Tetsuo Handa
2011-01-17  9:39               ` David Howells
2011-01-17 18:36               ` Jesper Juhl
2011-01-17 21:06               ` Mimi Zohar
2011-01-18  1:39                 ` [PATCH 3/3] trusted-keys: small cleanup Tetsuo Handa
2011-01-18  9:26                   ` Mimi Zohar
2011-01-18 11:03                     ` Tetsuo Handa
2011-01-18 11:28                       ` Mimi Zohar
2011-01-18 11:42                         ` Mimi Zohar
2011-01-17  9:34             ` [PATCH 2/3] trusted-keys: check for NULL before using it David Howells
2011-01-17 18:35             ` Jesper Juhl
2011-01-17 21:02             ` Mimi Zohar
2011-01-17  9:33           ` [PATCH 1/3] trusted-keys: another free memory bugfix David Howells
2011-01-17 18:34           ` Jesper Juhl
2011-01-17 21:01           ` Mimi Zohar
2011-01-18 22:55           ` James Morris
2011-01-14 13:31 ` [PATCH] Trusted and Encrypted Keys: fix up TSS_rawhmac() so we always kfree() and remember to call va_end() David Howells

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