From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
To: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>, Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>,
Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>,
Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Switch proc interfaces in kernel/ to %pK
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2011 18:13:42 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1295392422.1831.29.camel@dan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110118225205.GA4601@p183.telecom.by>
On Wed, 2011-01-19 at 00:52 +0200, Alexey Dobriyan wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 18, 2011 at 05:51:18PM -0500, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> > Switch users of %p in /proc interfaces in kernel/ to %pK, to allow
> > configuring the level of exposure of kernel pointers via the
> > kptr_restrict sysctl.
>
> > --- a/kernel/lockdep_proc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/lockdep_proc.c
>
> /proc/lockdep is r--------
> /proc/lockdep_chains is r--------
> /proc/lock_stat is rw-------
>
> Is this supposed to mean something?
It's certainly not a priority to switch these particular interfaces over
since they aren't exposed to unprivileged users. However, when
kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers aren't exposed at all, even
to root. Changing to %pK will certainly have no negative effect with
the default setting of 1 (hide when the reader does not have
CAP_SYSLOG).
Let me know if you're opposed and I can re-send a version that doesn't
touch these files.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-01-18 23:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-01-18 22:51 [PATCH] Switch proc interfaces in kernel/ to %pK Dan Rosenberg
2011-01-18 22:52 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-01-18 23:13 ` Dan Rosenberg [this message]
2011-01-18 22:52 ` Paul Menage
2011-01-19 1:29 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2011-01-19 15:04 ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-01-20 1:18 ` Masami Hiramatsu
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