Re: Using ftrace/perf as a basis for generic seccomp

[Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>]

On Sat, 2011-02-05 at 12:51 +0100, Stefan Fritsch wrote:

> A really major use case is socketcall(2). All socket related syscalls 
> (accept, bind, connect, receivemsg, ...) are implemented as socketcall 
> with an appropriate argument. There will be many cases where you want a 
> sandboxed process to be able to do recvmsg(2) to receive new file 
> descriptors over an already open unix-domain socket from a broker process. 
> But you may want to disallow other socket operations, especially listen, 
> accept, and connect.
> 
> Of course one could also add some special case handling for socketcall 
> in seccomp instead of using the full filtering.

That looks like a perfect use-case for the LSM bits, attach some state
to both the fd object and the task object and if they don't match, don't
allow the action.