Re: [PATCH] random: update interface comments to reflect reality

[Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>]

On Thu, 2011-02-17 at 17:23 -0500, Jarod Wilson wrote:
> At present, the comment header in random.c makes no mention of
> add_disk_randomness, and instead, suggests that disk activity adds to the
> random pool by way of add_interrupt_randomness, which appears to not have
> been the case since sometime prior to the existence of git, and even prior
> to bitkeeper. Didn't look any further back. At least, as far as I can
> tell, there are no storage drivers setting IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM, which is a
> requirement for add_interrupt_randomness to trigger, so the only way for a
> disk to contribute entropy is by way of add_disk_randomness. Update
> comments accordingly, complete with special mention about solid state
> drives being a crappy source of entropy (see e2e1a148bc for reference).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>

Sure. Herbert, let's route this through your crypto tree.

Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>

> ---
>  drivers/char/random.c |   13 ++++++++++---
>  1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index 908ac1f..3dba627 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@
>   * 	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
>   *                                unsigned int value);
>   * 	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
> + * 	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
>   *
>   * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
>   * the event type information from the hardware.
> @@ -136,9 +137,15 @@
>   * inputs to the entropy pool.  Note that not all interrupts are good
>   * sources of randomness!  For example, the timer interrupts is not a
>   * good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is too
> - * regular, and hence predictable to an attacker.  Disk interrupts are
> - * a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
> - * unpredictable.
> + * regular, and hence predictable to an attacker.  Network Interface
> + * Controller interrupts are a better measure, since the timing of the
> + * NIC interrupts are more unpredictable.
> + *
> + * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
> + * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
> + * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
> + * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
> + * times are usually fairly consistent.
>   *
>   * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
>   * particular randomness source.  They do this by keeping track of the
> 
> 


-- 
Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.