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From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, davej@redhat.com,
	kees.cook@canonical.com, davem@davemloft.net, eranian@google.com,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, adobriyan@gmail.com,
	penberg@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [BUG] perf: bogus correlation of kernel symbols
Date: Mon, 16 May 2011 12:14:12 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1305562452.1818.10.camel@dan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110516153527.GC21107@elte.hu>

On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 17:35 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:

> Agreed, it would be a very useful feature.
> 
> I'd suggest to implement it along the lines of:
> 
>  - First check whether grsecurity or PAX has this implemented already via the
>    relocation facility - they are pretty good at being paranoid so i'd be 
>    surprised if they didnt think of this already! :-)
> 
>  - If not then have a look at CONFIG_RELOCATABLE and to relocate the kernel 
>    binary intentionally via a hardcoded parameter. Just see whether you can do 
>    it and whether it works as you expect it. Check /proc/kallsyms changing 
>    after your patch. Enjoy the kernel still working ;-)
> 
>  - Then promote it to a boot parameter - this way you'll be able to tell 
>    whether there's any hidden build-time assumptions about relocation position. 
>    (there really shouldnt be any given that kexec works just fine - but i'd 
>     suggest this step just in case.)
> 
>  - Then promote that hack to be a randomized parameter. Marvel at a different,
>    randomized /proc/kallsyms output at every bootup and enjoy the still working 
>    kernel!
> 
>  - Then look at all RIP outputs (thanks to your prior efforts they are now 
>    mostly concentrated in the vprints code!) and reverse apply the random 
>    offset before it's exported into user-space. wchan, etc. Marvel at the 
>    constant /proc/kallsyms output, fully knowing that the *real* addresses
>    are randomized.
> 
>  - Please do not forget to transfer perf RIPs and callchains and marvel at the
>    well working 'perf top' output.
> 
> At that point the feature will be highly useful already IMO. Remaining work 
> will be to think through and close down all remaining avenues of RIP leakage. 
> 
> At this point kptr_restrict will be a lot less relevant - the symbols will 
> expose offsets (so it's not totally unhelpful to attackers) but not the real 
> absolute addresses.
> 
> Unless i'm missing some particularly difficult roadblock, which is possible.
> 
> If you try this then please keep us posted at every step above, even if your 
> patches are not fully working and useful yet. Maybe some other 
> details/ideas/suggestions will arise at that point.
> 

Thanks for the detailed response.  I will attempt to go down this road,
and will keep people posted with my progress.

-Dan

> Thanks,
> 
> 	Ingo



  reply	other threads:[~2011-05-16 16:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <1305292059.1949.0.camel@dan>
2011-05-13 13:29 ` [BUG] perf: bogus correlation of kernel symbols Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-16 15:35   ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-16 16:14     ` Dan Rosenberg [this message]
2011-05-20  0:56     ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-20 12:07       ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-20 12:54         ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-20 13:11           ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-20 17:41             ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-20 18:14               ` Linus Torvalds
2011-05-20 18:27                 ` Kees Cook
2011-05-20 18:34                   ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-20 18:42                     ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-20 18:28                 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-22  6:11                 ` david
2011-05-20 18:35               ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-22 18:45             ` Dan Rosenberg
     [not found]               ` <BANLkTik1SK_kWVvGsKk0SqdByQ5-0b5nFg@mail.gmail.com>
2011-05-23  0:25                 ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-23  0:37                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-05-23 10:49                   ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-23 19:02                     ` Ray Lee
2011-05-23 19:35                       ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-24  1:59                     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-05-24  4:06                       ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 14:48 Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 18:06 ` David Miller
2011-05-12 18:37   ` Dave Jones
2011-05-12 19:01     ` David Miller
2011-05-12 19:58       ` Pekka Enberg
2011-05-13  6:12         ` Kees Cook
2011-05-13  6:24           ` Pekka Enberg
2011-05-12 20:24       ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-05-12 21:06   ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 20:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-05-12 20:43   ` David Miller
2011-05-12 21:07   ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 21:30     ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 21:35       ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 21:38         ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 21:50           ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 21:56             ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 22:00               ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 22:07             ` Dave Jones
2011-05-12 22:15               ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-13  9:01                 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-13  8:57               ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-13 16:23                 ` Andi Kleen
2011-05-17 12:17                   ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 21:36     ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 21:41       ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 21:54         ` Ingo Molnar

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