From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, davej@redhat.com,
kees.cook@canonical.com, davem@davemloft.net, eranian@google.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, adobriyan@gmail.com,
penberg@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [BUG] perf: bogus correlation of kernel symbols
Date: Mon, 16 May 2011 12:14:12 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1305562452.1818.10.camel@dan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110516153527.GC21107@elte.hu>
On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 17:35 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> Agreed, it would be a very useful feature.
>
> I'd suggest to implement it along the lines of:
>
> - First check whether grsecurity or PAX has this implemented already via the
> relocation facility - they are pretty good at being paranoid so i'd be
> surprised if they didnt think of this already! :-)
>
> - If not then have a look at CONFIG_RELOCATABLE and to relocate the kernel
> binary intentionally via a hardcoded parameter. Just see whether you can do
> it and whether it works as you expect it. Check /proc/kallsyms changing
> after your patch. Enjoy the kernel still working ;-)
>
> - Then promote it to a boot parameter - this way you'll be able to tell
> whether there's any hidden build-time assumptions about relocation position.
> (there really shouldnt be any given that kexec works just fine - but i'd
> suggest this step just in case.)
>
> - Then promote that hack to be a randomized parameter. Marvel at a different,
> randomized /proc/kallsyms output at every bootup and enjoy the still working
> kernel!
>
> - Then look at all RIP outputs (thanks to your prior efforts they are now
> mostly concentrated in the vprints code!) and reverse apply the random
> offset before it's exported into user-space. wchan, etc. Marvel at the
> constant /proc/kallsyms output, fully knowing that the *real* addresses
> are randomized.
>
> - Please do not forget to transfer perf RIPs and callchains and marvel at the
> well working 'perf top' output.
>
> At that point the feature will be highly useful already IMO. Remaining work
> will be to think through and close down all remaining avenues of RIP leakage.
>
> At this point kptr_restrict will be a lot less relevant - the symbols will
> expose offsets (so it's not totally unhelpful to attackers) but not the real
> absolute addresses.
>
> Unless i'm missing some particularly difficult roadblock, which is possible.
>
> If you try this then please keep us posted at every step above, even if your
> patches are not fully working and useful yet. Maybe some other
> details/ideas/suggestions will arise at that point.
>
Thanks for the detailed response. I will attempt to go down this road,
and will keep people posted with my progress.
-Dan
> Thanks,
>
> Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-05-16 16:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <1305292059.1949.0.camel@dan>
2011-05-13 13:29 ` [BUG] perf: bogus correlation of kernel symbols Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-16 15:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-16 16:14 ` Dan Rosenberg [this message]
2011-05-20 0:56 ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-20 12:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-20 12:54 ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-20 13:11 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-20 17:41 ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-20 18:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-05-20 18:27 ` Kees Cook
2011-05-20 18:34 ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-20 18:42 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-20 18:28 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-22 6:11 ` david
2011-05-20 18:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-22 18:45 ` Dan Rosenberg
[not found] ` <BANLkTik1SK_kWVvGsKk0SqdByQ5-0b5nFg@mail.gmail.com>
2011-05-23 0:25 ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-05-23 0:37 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-05-23 10:49 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-23 19:02 ` Ray Lee
2011-05-23 19:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-24 1:59 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-05-24 4:06 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 14:48 Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 18:06 ` David Miller
2011-05-12 18:37 ` Dave Jones
2011-05-12 19:01 ` David Miller
2011-05-12 19:58 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-05-13 6:12 ` Kees Cook
2011-05-13 6:24 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-05-12 20:24 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-05-12 21:06 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 20:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-05-12 20:43 ` David Miller
2011-05-12 21:07 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 21:30 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 21:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 21:38 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 21:50 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 21:56 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 22:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 22:07 ` Dave Jones
2011-05-12 22:15 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-13 9:01 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-13 8:57 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-13 16:23 ` Andi Kleen
2011-05-17 12:17 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 21:36 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-12 21:41 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-05-12 21:54 ` Ingo Molnar
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