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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernl.org, cluster-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 13/21] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in gfs2
Date: Mon, 16 May 2011 14:20:44 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1305570044.2669.69.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1305568671.2855.31.camel@menhir>

On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 18:57 +0100, Steven Whitehouse wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 13:50 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 12:35 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 17:14 +0100, Steven Whitehouse wrote:
> > > > Hi,
> > > > 
> > > > On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 11:50 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > > On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 16:30 +0100, Steven Whitehouse wrote:
> > > > > > Hi,
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 10:45 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > > > > After creating the initial LSM security extended attribute, call
> > > > > > > evm_inode_post_init_security() to create the 'security.evm'
> > > > > > > extended attribute.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
> > > > > > > ---
> > > > > > >  fs/gfs2/inode.c |   28 +++++++++++++++++++---------
> > > > > > >  1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > [snip]
> > > > > > > +	struct xattr lsm_xattr;
> > > > > > > +	struct xattr evm_xattr;
> > > > > > >  
> > > > > > >  	err = security_inode_init_security(&ip->i_inode, &dip->i_inode, qstr,
> > > > > > > -					   &name, &value, &len);
> > > > > > > +					   &lsm_xattr.name, &lsm_xattr.value,
> > > > > > > +					   &lsm_xattr.value_len);
> > > > > > >  
> > > > > > >  	if (err) {
> > > > > > >  		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
> > > > > > > @@ -780,11 +781,20 @@ static int gfs2_security_init(struct gfs2_inode *dip, struct gfs2_inode *ip,
> > > > > > >  		return err;
> > > > > > >  	}
> > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > -	err = __gfs2_xattr_set(&ip->i_inode, name, value, len, 0,
> > > > > > > -			       GFS2_EATYPE_SECURITY);
> > > > > > > -	kfree(value);
> > > > > > > -	kfree(name);
> > > > > > > -
> > > > > > > +	err = __gfs2_xattr_set(&ip->i_inode, lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
> > > > > > > +			       lsm_xattr.value_len, 0, GFS2_EATYPE_SECURITY);
> > > > > > > +	if (err < 0)
> > > > > > > +		goto out;
> > > > > > > +	err = evm_inode_post_init_security(&ip->i_inode, &lsm_xattr,
> > > > > > > +					   &evm_xattr);
> > > > > > > +	if (err)
> > > > > > > +		goto out;
> > > > > > > +	err = __gfs2_xattr_set(&ip->i_inode, evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
> > > > > > > +			       evm_xattr.value_len, 0, GFS2_EATYPE_SECURITY);
> > > > > > > +	kfree(evm_xattr.value);
> > > > > > > +out:
> > > > > > > +	kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
> > > > > > > +	kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
> > > > > > >  	return err;
> > > > > > >  }
> > > > > > >  
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Just wondering whether we could have a single call to the security
> > > > > > subsystem which returns a vector of xattrs rather than having to call
> > > > > > two different functions?
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Steve.
> > > > > 
> > > > > There are a number of places that the LSM function is called immediately
> > > > > followed by either EVM/IMA.  In each of those places it is hidden from
> > > > > the caller by calling the security_inode_XXX_security().  In this case
> > > > > each fs has it's own method of creating an extended attribute.  If that
> > > > > method could be passed to security_inode_init_security, then
> > > > > security_inode_init_security() could call both the LSM and EVM functions
> > > > > directly.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Mimi
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > I'm still not quite sure I understand... from a (very brief) look at the
> > > > paper, it seems that what you are trying to do is add a new xattr to
> > > > inodes which has some hash of some of the inode metadata (presumably
> > > > including the selinux xattr and some other fields).
> > > 
> > > Yes, for the time being the other metadata is i_ino, i_generation,
> > > i_uid, i_gid, and i_mode.  The IMA-appriasal extension would store the
> > > file hash as an extended attribute. The digital-signature extension
> > > would store a digitial signature instead of the hash.
> > > 
> > > > I'm not sure why it matters whether the selinux data has been written to
> > > > the buffers before the xattr containing the hash? The data will not
> > > > change (I hope!) and if it does presumably the hash will pick that up
> > > > when it is checked at a later date?
> > > 
> > > In this case it doesn't matter, as there aren't any other xattrs at this
> > > point.  When the file closes, the file hash would be written out as
> > > security.ima, causing security.evm to be updated to reflect the change.
> > > 
> > > > The reason I'm asking is that currently the creation of GFS2 inodes is
> > > > broken down into a number of transactions, carefully designed to ensure
> > > > that the correct clean up occurs if there is an error. I would like to
> > > > try and reduce the number of transactions during the create process
> > > > where possible. That means I would like to move to a model which looks
> > > > like this:
> > > > 
> > > > 1. Calculate number of blocks required, based on inode + xattrs (if any)
> > > > 2. Allocate blocks
> > > > 3. Populate with data (i.e. set xattrs)
> > > > 
> > > > I'm trying to work out whether there is some reason why we have to use
> > > > your proposed:
> > > > 
> > > > 1. Get selinux xattr
> > > > 2. Set selinux xattr
> > > > 3. Get EVM xattr
> > > > 4. Set EVM xattr
> > > > 
> > > > as opposed to getting all the xattrs in a single call and then being
> > > > able to set them all in a single operation, if that makes sense?
> > > > 
> > > > Steve.
> > > 
> > > Yes, it makes sense.
> > 
> > Just to clarify (and am cc'ing Stephen, Eric, and Casey).
> > 
> > Instead of:
> > 
> > int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> >                                  const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
> >                                  void **value, size_t *len);
> > 
> > You're suggesting changing the interface to something like:
> > 
> > int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> >                                  const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr **xattrs);
> > 
> > where 'struct xattr' is defined as (9th patch):
> > 
> > --- a/include/linux/xattr.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
> > @@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ struct xattr_handler {
> >                    size_t size, int flags, int handler_flags);
> >  };
> > 
> > +struct xattr {
> > +       char *name;
> > +       void *value;
> > +       size_t value_len;
> > +};
> > +
> >  ssize_t xattr_getsecurity(struct inode *, const char *, void *, size_t);
> >  ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t);
> >  ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size);
> > 
> > xattrs would be null terminated. The fs would be responsible for freeing the xattrs?
> > 
> > thanks,
> > 
> > Mimi
> > 
> 
> Yes, if that makes sense... I got the impression from the paper that
> there is the possibility of more xattrs being added in future and this
> way the fs end of things wouldn't have to change again when that
> happens. I'm still trying to get my head around it all, but it seems a
> cleaner solution to me - though I may well be missing something still,
> 
> Steve.

At this point at least, the only other xattr would be security.ima,
which isn't created/updated until __fput() is called.  

Your suggestion of security_inode_init_security() returning multiple
xattrs is a cleaner solution for EVM, but such a change requires the LSM
folks approval.

thanks,

Mimi


  reply	other threads:[~2011-05-16 18:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-05-16 14:44 [PATCH v5 00/21] EVM Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:44 ` [PATCH v5 01/21] integrity: move ima inode integrity data management Mimi Zohar
2011-05-19  2:06   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-19 22:45     ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:44 ` [PATCH v5 02/21] xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp Mimi Zohar
2011-05-19  2:11   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-16 14:44 ` [PATCH v5 03/21] evm: re-release Mimi Zohar
2011-05-19  6:05   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-19 22:49     ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-20 11:12       ` Harald Hoyer
2011-05-20 11:21         ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-19 21:37   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-20 12:29     ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-20 13:43       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-16 14:44 ` [PATCH v5 04/21] evm: add support for different security.evm data types Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:44 ` [PATCH v5 05/21] ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file Mimi Zohar
2011-05-19 22:06   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-20  0:55     ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-20 13:40       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-20 14:34         ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-20 15:25           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 06/21] security: imbed evm calls in security hooks Mimi Zohar
2011-05-19 22:13   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 07/21] evm: evm_inode_post_removexattr Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 08/21] evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 09/21] evm: evm_inode_post_init Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 10/21] fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 11/21] evm: crypto hash replaced by shash Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 12/21] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in btrfs Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 13/21] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in gfs2 Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 15:30   ` Steven Whitehouse
2011-05-16 15:50     ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 16:14       ` Steven Whitehouse
2011-05-16 16:35         ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 17:50           ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 17:57             ` Steven Whitehouse
2011-05-16 18:20               ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2011-05-16 18:23               ` Casey Schaufler
2011-05-16 18:48                 ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 19:25                   ` Casey Schaufler
2011-05-19  0:55                     ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-19  9:25                       ` Steven Whitehouse
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 14/21] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in jffs2 Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 15/21] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in jfs Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 16/21] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in xfs Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 17/21] evm: additional parameter to pass integrity cache entry 'iint' Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 18/21] evm: evm_verify_hmac must not return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 19/21] evm: replace hmac_status with evm_status Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 20/21] evm: permit only valid security.evm xattrs to be updated Mimi Zohar
2011-05-16 14:45 ` [PATCH v5 21/21] evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evm Mimi Zohar
2011-05-19  0:25 ` [PATCH v5 00/21] EVM Andrew Morton
2011-05-19  1:51   ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-20  0:51     ` James Morris
2011-05-20  1:07       ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-20 13:06         ` David Safford
2011-05-20 14:13       ` Casey Schaufler
2011-05-26  6:08   ` Pavel Machek
2011-05-26 16:34     ` Casey Schaufler
2011-05-26 18:11       ` David Safford
2011-05-26 18:38         ` Pavel Machek
2011-05-26 19:30           ` Casey Schaufler
2011-05-26 20:02             ` Pavel Machek
2011-05-26 20:32               ` Casey Schaufler
2011-05-26 19:49           ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-26 20:17             ` Pavel Machek
2011-05-27 17:45               ` David Safford
2011-05-29  6:58                 ` Pavel Machek
2011-05-31 12:05                   ` Mimi Zohar
2011-05-31 13:40                     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-06-01 22:11                   ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2011-05-20 18:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-05-23 22:09   ` Mimi Zohar

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