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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vfs: fix IMA lockdep circular locking dependency
Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 17:18:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1337807899.15138.31.camel@falcor> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120516021828.GP22082@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Wed, 2012-05-16 at 03:18 +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 05:45:44PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 5:42 PM, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> > >

> Frankly, I would split it in two - one introducing security_mmap_addr()
> and converting the callers, and another doing the rest of it.

Ok, I split the patch. Hopefully it is bisect safe. The results of which
are available from
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
#next-vfs-changes.  But before posting them, I'd like to understand what
should be done regarding the issues you raised.

> Said that, I'm not sure I like the resulting picture.
> 
> 1) caller in __bprm_mm_init() is simply ridiculous - note that
> arguments are bleeding *constants*, so it might very well have
> been a BUG_ON().  If it fails, you'll have every execve() fail.

ok, checking the addr based on the same constants doesn't make sense.
Replace it with a BUG_ON() as you suggested?

> 2) get_unmapped_area() probably ought to grow such a caller and
> I really suspect that it would've killed quite a few of them.

?

> 3) expand_downwards() seems to be missing the basic sanity checks on the
> validity of VMA range (arch_mmap_check(), that is).  itanic opencodes
> the equivalent before calling expand_stack(); arm and mn10300 do not
> bother, which might or might not be legitimate - depends on whether
> one can get a fault in the first page *and* reach the check_stack:
> in e.g. arm __do_page_fault().  Which just might be possible, if attacker
> maps something just above said first page with MAP_GROWSDOWN and
> tries to write at very small address - IIRC, the first page on arm
> contains the stuff that shouldn't be world-writable...  s390 doesn't
> care and I'm not sure about sparc32/sparc64 - it looks like that shouldn't
> be possible to hit, but...

?

> 4) i810_dma.c ought to be switched to vm_mmap() - as discussed in that
> thread back then, magical mystery wank with ->f_op reassignments does
> not rely on ->mmap_sem for protection and thus can be taken out of
> under ->mmap_sem.

Ok, replacing the do_mmap() with vm_mmap() would be a separate patch,
but it still leaves the existing f_op reassignment with locking issues.

thanks,

Mimi


  reply	other threads:[~2012-05-23 21:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-05-14  2:47 [PATCH] vfs: fix IMA lockdep circular locking dependency Mimi Zohar
2012-05-15  0:29 ` James Morris
2012-05-15  0:51   ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-15 15:14     ` James Morris
2012-05-15 16:06       ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-15 17:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-15 18:36   ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-15 18:41   ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-15 19:42     ` Eric Paris
2012-05-15 20:07       ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-15 21:43         ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-16  0:37           ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-16  0:42             ` Al Viro
2012-05-16  0:45               ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-16  1:53                 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-16 11:37                   ` James Morris
2012-05-16 11:38                     ` James Morris
2012-05-16 13:27                       ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-16 13:42                     ` Eric Paris
2012-05-16 13:52                       ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-16 14:06                         ` Eric Paris
2012-05-16 15:23                           ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-16 15:47                           ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-16 16:09                             ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-16  2:18                 ` Al Viro
2012-05-23 21:18                   ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2012-05-30  4:34                     ` Al Viro
2012-05-30 16:36                       ` Al Viro
2012-05-30 19:42                         ` Eric Paris
2012-05-30 20:24                           ` Al Viro
2012-05-30 20:28                             ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-30 20:56                               ` Al Viro
2012-05-30 21:04                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-30 21:36                                   ` Al Viro
2012-05-30 22:51                                     ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-31  0:28                                       ` Al Viro
2012-05-31  0:40                                         ` Linus Torvalds
2012-05-31  0:56                                           ` Al Viro
2012-05-31  3:55                                             ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-31  4:20                                         ` James Morris
2012-05-30 20:33                             ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-30 20:53                               ` Al Viro
2012-05-16 14:13             ` Eric Paris
2012-05-16 15:13               ` Linus Torvalds

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