From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 08:50:32 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1349355032.2496.11.camel@falcor> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87obki23uv.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
On Thu, 2012-10-04 at 15:09 +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:
> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes:
>
> > On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 3:14 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >> As part of the effort to create a stronger boundary between root and
> >> kernel, Chrome OS wants to be able to enforce that kernel modules are
> >> being loaded only from our read-only crypto-hash verified (dm_verity)
> >> root filesystem. Since the init_module syscall hands the kernel a module
> >> as a memory blob, no reasoning about the origin of the blob can be made.
> >>
> >> Earlier proposals for appending signatures to kernel modules would not be
> >> useful in Chrome OS, since it would involve adding an additional set of
> >> keys to our kernel and builds for no good reason: we already trust the
> >> contents of our root filesystem. We don't need to verify those kernel
> >> modules a second time. Having to do signature checking on module loading
> >> would slow us down and be redundant. All we need to know is where a
> >> module is coming from so we can say yes/no to loading it.
> >>
> >> If a file descriptor is used as the source of a kernel module, many more
> >> things can be reasoned about. In Chrome OS's case, we could enforce that
> >> the module lives on the filesystem we expect it to live on. In the case
> >> of IMA (or other LSMs), it would be possible, for example, to examine
> >> extended attributes that may contain signatures over the contents of
> >> the module.
> >>
> >> This introduces a new syscall (on x86), similar to init_module, that has
> >> only two arguments. The first argument is used as a file descriptor to
> >> the module and the second argument is a pointer to the NULL terminated
> >> string of module arguments.
> >
> > Hi Rusty,
> >
> > Is this likely to land in the 3.7 change window? I'd really like to
> > get the syscall number assigned so I can start sending patches to
> > glibc, kmod, etc. My tree is here, FWIW:
>
> No, unfortunately it's a little late and there were issues with ARM
> signoffs and syscall numbers...
>
> > http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/module-fd-syscall
>
> Messy merge due to the module signing stuff going in :(
>
> Please rebase on top of my kernel.org modules-next branch, and I'll pull
> into my modules-wip branch for 3.8.
Why? Not only have you had these patches sitting for a while, way
before you had the kernel module patches, they've been acked/signed off
by Kees, Serge, Eric, and myself. All security subtree maintainers.
The module patches could have easily been built on top of Kees' small
patches. I am really disappointed!
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-10-04 12:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-09-20 22:14 [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd Kees Cook
2012-09-20 22:14 ` [PATCH 2/4] security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook Kees Cook
2012-09-21 12:42 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-20 22:14 ` [PATCH 3/4] ARM: add finit_module syscall to ARM Kees Cook
2012-09-21 13:15 ` Arnd Bergmann
2012-09-21 14:59 ` Russell King
2012-09-21 15:43 ` Kees Cook
2012-09-20 22:15 ` [PATCH 4/4] add finit_module syscall to asm-generic Kees Cook
2012-09-21 2:22 ` [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd James Morris
2012-09-21 3:07 ` Kees Cook
2012-09-21 3:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-21 17:56 ` John Johansen
2012-10-03 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-04 5:39 ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-04 12:50 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2012-10-05 3:50 ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-05 7:12 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-04 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-09 21:54 ` Michael Kerrisk
2012-10-09 21:58 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-09 22:03 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-09 22:09 ` H. Peter Anvin
[not found] ` <CAKgNAkjfkbYOQocuGRAKU=0P2CQCvmedhRMJZPnkUMnnxSOsqg@mail.gmail.com>
2012-10-10 5:54 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-11 22:16 ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-12 5:16 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-18 3:12 ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-18 5:39 ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-10-18 12:59 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-22 7:39 ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-23 2:37 ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-10-23 3:40 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-23 4:08 ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-10-23 15:42 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-23 15:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-23 16:25 ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-10-24 3:06 ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-23 7:38 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-30 21:57 ` Kees Cook
2012-11-01 1:03 ` Rusty Russell
2012-12-21 0:01 ` Michael Kerrisk
2013-01-03 0:12 ` Rusty Russell
2013-01-06 18:59 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2013-01-06 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2013-01-07 1:41 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2013-01-09 17:29 ` Lucas De Marchi
2013-01-10 0:55 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-18 4:24 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-18 8:05 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-18 14:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-18 15:28 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-18 15:30 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-19 2:23 ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-19 2:54 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-19 10:46 ` Alon Ziv
2012-10-20 4:05 ` Rusty Russell
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2012-10-04 20:22 [PATCH v5] " Kees Cook
2012-10-04 20:22 ` [PATCH 1/4] " Kees Cook
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