public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	opensuse-kernel@opensuse.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>,
	Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@suse.cz>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>,
	James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	JKosina@suse.com, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>,
	Gary Lin <GLin@suse.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and verify signature of snapshot
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 11:22:28 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1377573748.27967.60.camel@linux-s257.site> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130825163648.GI5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>

Hi Pavel, 

Thanks for your time to review my patches.

於 日,2013-08-25 於 18:36 +0200,Pavel Machek 提到:
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:51, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add the code for generate/verify signature of snapshot, it
> > put the signature to snapshot header. This approach can support both
> > on userspace hibernate and in-kernel hibernate.
> > 
> > v2:
> > - Due to loaded S4 sign key before ExitBootServices, we need forward key from
> >   boot kernel to resume target kernel. So this patch add a empty page in
> >   snapshot image, then we keep the pfn of this empty page in snapshot header.
> >   When system resume from hibernate, we fill new sign key to this empty page
> >   space after snapshot image checked pass. This mechanism let boot kernel can
> >   forward new sign key to resume target kernel but don't need write new private
> >   key to any other storage, e.g. swap.
> > 
> > Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> >  kernel/power/power.h    |    6 +
> >  kernel/power/snapshot.c |  280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  kernel/power/swap.c     |   14 +++
> >  kernel/power/user.c     |    9 ++
> >  4 files changed, 302 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
> > index 69a81d8..84e0b06 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/power.h
> > +++ b/kernel/power/power.h
> > @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
> >  #include <linux/utsname.h>
> >  #include <linux/freezer.h>
> >  
> > +/* The maximum length of snapshot signature */
> > +#define SIG_LENG 512
> > +
> >  struct swsusp_info {
> >  	struct new_utsname	uts;
> >  	u32			version_code;
> > @@ -11,6 +14,8 @@ struct swsusp_info {
> >  	unsigned long		image_pages;
> >  	unsigned long		pages;
> >  	unsigned long		size;
> > +	unsigned long           skey_data_buf_pfn;
> > +	u8			signature[SIG_LENG];
> >  } __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
> 
> SIG_LEN or SIG_LENGTH. Select one.
> 

I will use SIG_LEN at next version, thanks!

> 
> > +static int
> >  copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
> >  {
> >  	struct zone *zone;
> > -	unsigned long pfn;
> > +	unsigned long pfn, dst_pfn;
> ...
> > +	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0);
> > +	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> > +		pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm));
> > +		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
> > +	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
> > +	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> 
> Are you sure GFP_KERNEL allocation is okay at this phase of
> hibernation?
> 
> Could the hashing be done at later phase, when writing the image to
> disk?
> 

Thanks for you point out!

Yes, call memory allocate here is not a good design due to it causes
garbage in snapshot that will not released by resumed kernel.

I just finished another implementation, the respin patch extracts the
signature generation code to another function then call the function in
swsusp_save() after copy_data_pages() finished. We can write to memory
at that stage.

> >  
> > +void **h_buf;
> 
> helpfully named.
> 

I will change the name to handle_buffers;

> > +	ret = verify_signature(s4_wake_key, pks);
> > +	if (ret) {
> > +		pr_err("snapshot S4 signature verification fail: %d\n", ret);
> > +		goto error_verify;
> > +	} else
> > +		pr_info("snapshot S4 signature verification pass!\n");
> > +
> > +	if (pks->rsa.s)
> > +		mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > +	kfree(pks);
> 
> ret = 0 and fall through?
> 

When verification success, verify_signature() will return 0.

Yes, here have duplicate code, I will clear up it.

> > +	return 0;
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > +	if (pks->rsa.s)
> > +		mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > +error_mpi:
> > +	kfree(pks);
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> 
> 
> > +	ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
> > +	if (ret)
> > +		goto error_shash;
> > +
> > +	ret = snapshot_verify_signature(digest, digest_size);
> > +	if (ret)
> > +		goto error_verify;
> > +
> > +	kfree(h_buf);
> > +	kfree(digest);
> > +	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > +	return 0;
> 
> These four lines can be deleted.
> 

Yes, here also duplicate, I will remove.

> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > +error_shash:
> > +	kfree(h_buf);
> > +	kfree(digest);
> > +error_digest:
> > +	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> 									Pavel


Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee


  reply	other threads:[~2013-08-27  3:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-08-22 11:01 [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 01/18] asymmetric keys: add interface and skeleton for implement signature generation Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 15:53   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-26 10:17     ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:01   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-26 10:25     ` joeyli
2013-08-26 11:27       ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27  8:36         ` Jiri Kosina
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 04/18] asymmetric keys: implement OS2IP in rsa Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 05/18] asymmetric keys: implement RSASP1 Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 06/18] asymmetric keys: support parsing PKCS #8 private key information Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:10   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:13   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 08/18] Secure boot: Add new capability Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:14   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 09/18] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:16   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 10/18] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:22   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 16:26     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 10:49   ` Matt Fleming
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 11/18] Hibernate: introduced RSA key-pair to verify signature of snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:25   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27  9:04     ` joeyli
2013-08-27 11:29       ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 12:01         ` Manfred Hollstein
2013-08-27 14:17           ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 13:12         ` joeyli
2013-09-05  8:53   ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 10:13     ` joeyli
2013-09-05 10:31       ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 13:28         ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and " Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:36   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27  3:22     ` joeyli [this message]
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:39   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27  8:33     ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 14/18] Hibernate: applied SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION config to switch signature check Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 15/18] Hibernate: adapt to UEFI secure boot with " Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:42   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 10:14     ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 16/18] Hibernate: show the verification time for monitor performance Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 17/18] Hibernate: introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for select hash algorithm Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:43   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 10:22     ` joeyli
2013-08-27 11:30       ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 12:54         ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 18/18] Hibernate: notify bootloader regenerate key-pair for snapshot verification Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-28 21:01 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Florian Weimer
2013-08-29  0:01   ` joeyli
2013-08-29 21:32     ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-29 22:30       ` joeyli
2013-09-01 10:41     ` Florian Weimer
2013-09-01 16:04       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-01 16:40         ` Florian Weimer
2013-09-01 16:46           ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-02  2:12           ` joeyli

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1377573748.27967.60.camel@linux-s257.site \
    --to=jlee@suse.com \
    --cc=GLin@suse.com \
    --cc=JKosina@suse.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
    --cc=jwboyer@redhat.com \
    --cc=len.brown@intel.com \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-pm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=matt.fleming@intel.com \
    --cc=mjg59@srcf.ucam.org \
    --cc=mmarek@suse.cz \
    --cc=opensuse-kernel@opensuse.org \
    --cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
    --cc=rjw@sisk.pl \
    --cc=rusty@rustcorp.com.au \
    --cc=vgoyal@redhat.com \
    --cc=vojtech@suse.cz \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox