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From: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	opensuse-kernel@opensuse.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>,
	Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@suse.cz>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>,
	James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	JKosina@suse.com, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>,
	Gary Lin <GLin@suse.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
	Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/18] Hibernate: introduced RSA key-pair to verify signature of snapshot
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 17:04:43 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1377594283.20140.3.camel@linux-s257.site> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130825162554.GH5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>

Hi Pavel, 

於 日,2013-08-25 於 18:25 +0200,Pavel Machek 提到:
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:50, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Introduced a hibernate_key.c file to query the key pair from EFI variables
> > and maintain key pair for check signature of S4 snapshot image. We
> > loaded the private key when snapshot image stored success.
> > 
> > This patch introduced 2 EFI variables for store the key to sign S4 image and
> > verify signature when S4 wake up. The names and GUID are:
> >   S4SignKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21
> >   S4WakeKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21
> > 
> > S4SignKey is used by EFI bootloader to pass the RSA private key that packaged
> > by PKCS#8 format, kernel will read and parser it when system boot and reload
> > it when S4 resume. EFI bootloader need gnerate a new private key when every
> > time system boot.
> > 
> > S4WakeKey is used to pass the RSA public key that packaged by X.509
> > certificate, kernel will read and parser it for check the signature of
> > S4 snapshot image when S4 resume.
> > 
> > The follow-up patch will remove S4SignKey and S4WakeKey after load them
> > to kernel for avoid anyone can access it through efivarfs.
> > 
> > v3:
> > - Load S4 sign key before ExitBootServices.
> >   Load private key before ExitBootServices() then bootloader doesn't need
> >   generate key-pair for each booting:
> >    + Add setup_s4_keys() to eboot.c to load S4 sign key before ExitBootServices.
> >    + Reserve the memory block of sign key data blob in efi.c
> > - In Makefile, moved hibernate_keys.o before hibernate.o for load S4 sign
> >   key before check hibernate image. It makes sure the new sign key will be
> >   transfer to resume target kernel.
> > - Set "depends on EFI_STUB" in Kconfig
> > 
> > v2:
> > Add CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION for build of hibernate_keys.c depend on
> > Kconfig.
> > 
> > Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
> > Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> 
> 
> > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > @@ -368,6 +368,91 @@ free_handle:
> >  	return status;
> >  }
> >  
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> > +static efi_status_t setup_s4_keys(struct boot_params *params)
> > +{
> > +	struct setup_data *data;
> > +	unsigned long datasize;
> > +	u32 attr;
> > +	struct efi_s4_key *s4key;
> > +	efi_status_t status;
> > +
> > +	data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)params->hdr.setup_data;
> 
> A bit too many casts.

Thanks.
Yes, here is my mistake, I will remove "unsigned long" cast.

> 
> > @@ -1205,6 +1290,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
> >  
> >  	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
> >  
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> > +	setup_s4_keys(boot_params);
> > +#endif
> > +
> 
> Move ifdef inside the function?

OK, I will define a dummy function for non-verification situation.

> 
> > @@ -729,6 +792,11 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
> >  
> >  	set_bit(EFI_SYSTEM_TABLES, &x86_efi_facility);
> >  
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> > +	/* keep s4 key from setup_data */
> > +	efi_reserve_s4_skey_data();
> > +#endif
> > +
> 
> Here too.
> 

I will also use dummy function here. 


Thanks
Joey Lee


  reply	other threads:[~2013-08-27  9:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-08-22 11:01 [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 01/18] asymmetric keys: add interface and skeleton for implement signature generation Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 15:53   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-26 10:17     ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:01   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-26 10:25     ` joeyli
2013-08-26 11:27       ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27  8:36         ` Jiri Kosina
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 04/18] asymmetric keys: implement OS2IP in rsa Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 05/18] asymmetric keys: implement RSASP1 Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 06/18] asymmetric keys: support parsing PKCS #8 private key information Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:10   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:13   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 08/18] Secure boot: Add new capability Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:14   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 09/18] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:16   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 10/18] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:22   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 16:26     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 10:49   ` Matt Fleming
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 11/18] Hibernate: introduced RSA key-pair to verify signature of snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:25   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27  9:04     ` joeyli [this message]
2013-08-27 11:29       ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 12:01         ` Manfred Hollstein
2013-08-27 14:17           ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 13:12         ` joeyli
2013-09-05  8:53   ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 10:13     ` joeyli
2013-09-05 10:31       ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 13:28         ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and " Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:36   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27  3:22     ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:39   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27  8:33     ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 14/18] Hibernate: applied SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION config to switch signature check Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 15/18] Hibernate: adapt to UEFI secure boot with " Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:42   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 10:14     ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 16/18] Hibernate: show the verification time for monitor performance Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 17/18] Hibernate: introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for select hash algorithm Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:43   ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 10:22     ` joeyli
2013-08-27 11:30       ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 12:54         ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 18/18] Hibernate: notify bootloader regenerate key-pair for snapshot verification Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-28 21:01 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Florian Weimer
2013-08-29  0:01   ` joeyli
2013-08-29 21:32     ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-29 22:30       ` joeyli
2013-09-01 10:41     ` Florian Weimer
2013-09-01 16:04       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-01 16:40         ` Florian Weimer
2013-09-01 16:46           ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-02  2:12           ` joeyli

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