From: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
opensuse-kernel@opensuse.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>,
Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@suse.cz>,
Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>,
James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
JKosina@suse.com, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>,
Gary Lin <GLin@suse.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 15/18] Hibernate: adapt to UEFI secure boot with signature check
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 18:14:37 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1377598477.20140.5.camel@linux-s257.site> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130825164219.GK5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 日,2013-08-25 於 18:42 +0200,Pavel Machek 提到:
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:54, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > In current solution, the snapshot signature check used the RSA key-pair
> > that are generated by bootloader(e.g. shim) and pass the key-pair to
> > kernel through EFI variables. I choice to binding the snapshot
> > signature check mechanism with UEFI secure boot for provide stronger
> > protection of hibernate. Current behavior is following:
> >
> > + UEFI Secure Boot ON, Kernel found key-pair from shim:
> > Will do the S4 signature check.
> >
> > + UEFI Secure Boot ON, Kernel didn't find key-pair from shim:
> > Will lock down S4 function.
> >
> > + UEFI Secure Boot OFF
> > Will NOT do the S4 signature check.
> > Ignore any keys from bootloader.
> >
> > v2:
> > Replace sign_key_data_loaded() by skey_data_available() to check sign key data
> > is available for hibernate.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/hibernate.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++-
> > kernel/power/main.c | 11 +++++-
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
> > kernel/power/swap.c | 4 +-
> > kernel/power/user.c | 11 +++++
> > 5 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> > index c545b15..0f19f3d 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> > +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> > #include <linux/ctype.h>
> > #include <linux/genhd.h>
> > #include <linux/key.h>
> > +#include <linux/efi.h>
> >
> > #include "power.h"
> >
> > @@ -632,7 +633,14 @@ static void power_down(void)
> > int hibernate(void)
> > {
> > int error;
> > - int skey_error;
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> > + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !skey_data_available()) {
> > +#else
> > + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
> > +#endif
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + }
> >
> > lock_system_sleep();
> > /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */
> > @@ -799,6 +807,15 @@ static int software_resume(void)
> > if (error)
> > goto Unlock;
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> > + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !wkey_data_available()) {
> > +#else
> > + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
> > +#endif
> > + mutex_unlock(&pm_mutex);
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + }
> > +
> > /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */
> > if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
> > error = -EBUSY;
> > @@ -892,6 +909,15 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
> > int i;
> > char *start = buf;
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> > + if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT) && !skey_data_available()) {
> > +#else
> > + if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) {
> > +#endif
> > + buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled");
> > + return buf-start;
> > + }
> > +
> > for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) {
> > if (!hibernation_modes[i])
> > continue;
> > @@ -926,6 +952,14 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
> > char *p;
> > int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID;
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> > + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !skey_data_available()) {
> > +#else
> > + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
> > +#endif
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + }
> > +
> > p = memchr(buf, '\n', n);
> > len = p ? p - buf : n;
> >
>
> You clearly need some helper function.
> Pavel
>
I will use a help function to replace those ifdef block.
Thanks for your suggestion!
Joey Lee
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-27 10:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-22 11:01 [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 01/18] asymmetric keys: add interface and skeleton for implement signature generation Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 15:53 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-26 10:17 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:01 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-26 10:25 ` joeyli
2013-08-26 11:27 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 8:36 ` Jiri Kosina
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 04/18] asymmetric keys: implement OS2IP in rsa Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 05/18] asymmetric keys: implement RSASP1 Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 06/18] asymmetric keys: support parsing PKCS #8 private key information Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:10 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:13 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 08/18] Secure boot: Add new capability Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:14 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 09/18] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:16 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 10/18] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:22 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 16:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 10:49 ` Matt Fleming
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 11/18] Hibernate: introduced RSA key-pair to verify signature of snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:25 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 9:04 ` joeyli
2013-08-27 11:29 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 12:01 ` Manfred Hollstein
2013-08-27 14:17 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 13:12 ` joeyli
2013-09-05 8:53 ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 10:13 ` joeyli
2013-09-05 10:31 ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 13:28 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and " Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:36 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 3:22 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:39 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 8:33 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 14/18] Hibernate: applied SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION config to switch signature check Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 15/18] Hibernate: adapt to UEFI secure boot with " Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:42 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 10:14 ` joeyli [this message]
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 16/18] Hibernate: show the verification time for monitor performance Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 17/18] Hibernate: introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for select hash algorithm Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:43 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 10:22 ` joeyli
2013-08-27 11:30 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 12:54 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 18/18] Hibernate: notify bootloader regenerate key-pair for snapshot verification Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-28 21:01 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Florian Weimer
2013-08-29 0:01 ` joeyli
2013-08-29 21:32 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-29 22:30 ` joeyli
2013-09-01 10:41 ` Florian Weimer
2013-09-01 16:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-01 16:40 ` Florian Weimer
2013-09-01 16:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-02 2:12 ` joeyli
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1377598477.20140.5.camel@linux-s257.site \
--to=jlee@suse.com \
--cc=GLin@suse.com \
--cc=JKosina@suse.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
--cc=jwboyer@redhat.com \
--cc=len.brown@intel.com \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-pm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=matt.fleming@intel.com \
--cc=mjg59@srcf.ucam.org \
--cc=mmarek@suse.cz \
--cc=opensuse-kernel@opensuse.org \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=rjw@sisk.pl \
--cc=rusty@rustcorp.com.au \
--cc=vgoyal@redhat.com \
--cc=vojtech@suse.cz \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox