Re: [PATCH 01/12] Add BSD-style securelevel support

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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Add BSD-style securelevel support
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2013 18:31:05 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1378751464.17982.13.camel@x230.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <522DF6DC.1050303@zytor.com>

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On Mon, 2013-09-09 at 09:27 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 09/09/2013 08:49 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:

> > +1:  Secure mode. If set, userspace will be unable to perform direct access
> > +    to PCI devices, port IO access, access system memory directly via
> > +    /dev/mem and /dev/kmem, perform kexec_load(), use the userspace
> > +    software suspend mechanism, insert new ACPI code at runtime via the
> > +    custom_method interface or modify CPU MSRs (on x86). Certain drivers
> > +    may also limit additional interfaces.
> > +
> 
> This will break or have to be redefined once you have signed kexec.

So, thinking about this, how about defining it as:

1:  Secure mode. If set, userspace will be prevented from performing any
operation that would permit the insertion of untrusted code into the
running kernel. At present this includes direct access to PCI devices,
port IO access,  direct system memory access via /dev/mem and /dev/kmem,
kexec_load(), the userspace software suspend mechanism, insertion of new
ACPI code at runtime via the custom_method interface or modification of
CPU MSRs (on x86). Certain drivers may also limit additional interfaces.

-- 
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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next prev parent reply	other threads:[~2013-09-09 18:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-09 15:49 [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add BSD-style securelevel support Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 16:27   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 16:30     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 16:42       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 16:44         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 16:51           ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 16:55             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 18:31     ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when securelevel is greater than 0 Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down BAR access when securelevel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when securelevel is set Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2013-11-26 12:54   ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when securelevel is set Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set securelevel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 17:18 ` [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown Valdis.Kletnieks
2013-09-09 17:24   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 18:25   ` David Lang
2013-09-09 18:28     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 18:40       ` David Lang
2013-09-09 18:42         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 18:53           ` David Lang
2013-09-09 19:06             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 19:59               ` David Lang
2013-09-09 20:06                 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 20:15                   ` David Lang
2013-09-09 20:17                     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 19:01     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2013-09-09 19:08       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 19:41       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 19:52         ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-09 19:56           ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 19:58             ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-09 20:02               ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 20:10           ` David Lang
2013-09-09 20:13             ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-09 23:02     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 23:19       ` David Lang
2013-09-09 23:20         ` Kees Cook
2013-09-09 23:30           ` James Bottomley
2013-09-09 23:34             ` Kees Cook
2013-09-10  0:53         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-10  2:44           ` David Lang
2013-09-10  2:55             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-10  3:09               ` David Lang
2013-09-10  3:53                 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-10 17:23                   ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2013-09-10 18:26                     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-10 18:29                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-10 18:51                         ` gregkh
2013-09-10 18:55                           ` Kees Cook
2013-09-10 19:17                             ` David Lang
2013-09-10 19:44                               ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-10 23:43                                 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-09-10 23:48                                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-10 23:55                                     ` Mimi Zohar
2013-09-10 23:58                                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-10 18:48                       ` Kees Cook
2013-09-11  9:32                       ` joeyli
2013-09-09 20:30 ` Mimi Zohar

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