From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
d.kasatkin@samsung.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, hpa@zytor.com,
matthew.garrett@nebula.com, vgoyal@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 13/16] kexec: Allow only signed processes to call sys_kexec() in secureboot mode
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 17:44:28 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1378849471-10521-14-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1378849471-10521-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Modify sys_kexec() so that it allows only signed processes to execute
sys_kexec() when secureboot is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
kernel/kexec.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 59f7b55..478566e 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -907,6 +907,31 @@ static int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image,
return result;
}
+static int check_task_signature(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const struct cred *cred;
+
+ /* If secureboot is enabled, There are extra checks required */
+ /* TODO: Change it once secure_level patches stablize */
+/*
+ if (!secure_modules())
+ return ret;
+*/
+ /*
+ * Calling process should be signed, memlocked.
+ */
+
+ if (!test_bit(MMF_VM_LOCKED, ¤t->mm->flags))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ cred = current_cred();
+ if (!cred->proc_signed)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Exec Kernel system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it.
*
@@ -942,6 +967,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
return -EPERM;
+ result = check_task_signature();
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+
/*
* Verify we have a legal set of flags
* This leaves us room for future extensions.
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-09-10 21:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-09-10 21:44 [PATCH 00/16] [RFC PATCH] Signed kexec support Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 01/16] mm: vm_brk(), align the length to page boundary Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 02/16] integrity: Add a function to determine digital signature length Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 03/16] ima: Allow adding more memory locking metadata after digital signature v2 Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 04/16] integrity: Allow digital signature verification with a given keyring ptr Vivek Goyal
2013-09-11 17:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 05/16] integrity: Export a function to retrieve hash algo used in digital signature Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 06/16] ima: export new IMA functions for signature verification Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 07/16] mm: Define a task flag MMF_VM_LOCKED for memlocked tasks and don't allow munlock Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 08/16] binfmt_elf: Elf executable signature verification Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 09/16] ima: define functions to appraise memory buffer contents Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 10/16] keyctl: Introduce a new operation KEYCTL_VERIFY_SIGNATURE Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 11/16] ptrace: Do not allow ptrace() from unsigned process to signed one Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 12/16] binfmt_elf: Do not mark process signed if binary has elf interpreter Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 14/16] kexec: Export sysfs attributes for secureboot and secure modules to user space Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 22:40 ` Greg KH
2013-09-11 13:44 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 22:57 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-11 13:51 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 15/16] bootparam: Pass acpi_rsdp pointer in bootparam Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 22:52 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-11 11:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-11 13:45 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-11 14:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-12 7:34 ` Dave Young
2013-09-12 12:53 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20130912131930.GC28500@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 14:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-12 14:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-12 14:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-13 7:12 ` Dave Young
2013-09-13 11:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 16/16] mount: Add a flag to not follow symlink at the end of mount point Vivek Goyal
2013-09-12 3:40 ` [PATCH 00/16] [RFC PATCH] Signed kexec support Greg KH
2013-09-12 11:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-12 16:17 ` Greg KH
2013-09-12 18:24 ` Mimi Zohar
[not found] ` <20130916142852.GB20753@redhat.com>
2013-09-18 14:51 ` Andrea Adami
2013-09-23 17:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-16 14:24 ` Vivek Goyal
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