From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
d.kasatkin@samsung.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, hpa@zytor.com,
matthew.garrett@nebula.com, vgoyal@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 14/16] kexec: Export sysfs attributes for secureboot and secure modules to user space
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 17:44:29 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1378849471-10521-15-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1378849471-10521-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com>
User space kexec-tools need to know whether to verify signature of kernel
image being loaded. This patch exports two knobs to user space. One is
for knowing if secureboot is enabled, this knob will be set to 1 if secure
boot is enabled. Other knob is secure_module_enabled. This knob will be set
to 1 if secure modules is one.
kexec-tools will verify signature of kernel image if either secureboot is
enabled or secure modules is enabled. The only difference between two is
that kexec-tools will set secureboot on in bootparams being passed to
second kernel if secureboot is on in first kernel.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
kernel/ksysfs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/ksysfs.c b/kernel/ksysfs.c
index 6ada93c..7262245 100644
--- a/kernel/ksysfs.c
+++ b/kernel/ksysfs.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#define KERNEL_ATTR_RO(_name) \
static struct kobj_attribute _name##_attr = __ATTR_RO(_name)
@@ -101,6 +103,25 @@ static ssize_t kexec_crash_loaded_show(struct kobject *kobj,
}
KERNEL_ATTR_RO(kexec_crash_loaded);
+static ssize_t secureboot_enabled_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ /* TODO: Change it once secureboot patches are in */
+ return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", 1);
+}
+KERNEL_ATTR_RO(secureboot_enabled);
+
+static ssize_t secure_modules_enabled_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO: Change it once secure_modules() or secure_level() patches
+ * are in
+ */
+ return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", 1);
+}
+KERNEL_ATTR_RO(secure_modules_enabled);
+
static ssize_t kexec_crash_size_show(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
@@ -196,6 +217,10 @@ static struct attribute * kernel_attrs[] = {
&kexec_crash_size_attr.attr,
&vmcoreinfo_attr.attr,
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
+ &secureboot_enabled_attr.attr,
+#endif
+ &secure_modules_enabled_attr.attr,
&rcu_expedited_attr.attr,
NULL
};
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-09-10 21:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-09-10 21:44 [PATCH 00/16] [RFC PATCH] Signed kexec support Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 01/16] mm: vm_brk(), align the length to page boundary Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 02/16] integrity: Add a function to determine digital signature length Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 03/16] ima: Allow adding more memory locking metadata after digital signature v2 Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 04/16] integrity: Allow digital signature verification with a given keyring ptr Vivek Goyal
2013-09-11 17:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 05/16] integrity: Export a function to retrieve hash algo used in digital signature Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 06/16] ima: export new IMA functions for signature verification Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 07/16] mm: Define a task flag MMF_VM_LOCKED for memlocked tasks and don't allow munlock Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 08/16] binfmt_elf: Elf executable signature verification Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 09/16] ima: define functions to appraise memory buffer contents Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 10/16] keyctl: Introduce a new operation KEYCTL_VERIFY_SIGNATURE Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 11/16] ptrace: Do not allow ptrace() from unsigned process to signed one Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 12/16] binfmt_elf: Do not mark process signed if binary has elf interpreter Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 13/16] kexec: Allow only signed processes to call sys_kexec() in secureboot mode Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2013-09-10 22:40 ` [PATCH 14/16] kexec: Export sysfs attributes for secureboot and secure modules to user space Greg KH
2013-09-11 13:44 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 22:57 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-11 13:51 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 15/16] bootparam: Pass acpi_rsdp pointer in bootparam Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 22:52 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-11 11:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-11 13:45 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-11 14:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-12 7:34 ` Dave Young
2013-09-12 12:53 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20130912131930.GC28500@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 14:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-12 14:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-12 14:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-13 7:12 ` Dave Young
2013-09-13 11:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 16/16] mount: Add a flag to not follow symlink at the end of mount point Vivek Goyal
2013-09-12 3:40 ` [PATCH 00/16] [RFC PATCH] Signed kexec support Greg KH
2013-09-12 11:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-12 16:17 ` Greg KH
2013-09-12 18:24 ` Mimi Zohar
[not found] ` <20130916142852.GB20753@redhat.com>
2013-09-18 14:51 ` Andrea Adami
2013-09-23 17:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-16 14:24 ` Vivek Goyal
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