From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
To: gleb@redhat.com
Cc: aik@ozlabs.ru, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] kvm: Add VFIO device for handling IOMMU cache coherency
Date: Thu, 03 Oct 2013 14:40:42 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1380832842.2673.80.camel@ul30vt.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131003025134.8850.97617.stgit@bling.home>
On Wed, 2013-10-02 at 20:55 -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> So far we've succeeded at making KVM and VFIO mostly unaware of each
> other, but there's an important point where that breaks down. Intel
> VT-d hardware may or may not support snoop control. When snoop
> control is available, intel-iommu promotes No-Snoop transactions on
> PCIe to be cache coherent. That allows KVM to handle things like the
> x86 WBINVD opcode as a nop. When the hardware does not support this,
> KVM must implement a hardware visible WBINVD for the guest.
>
> We could simply let userspace tell KVM how to handle WBINVD, but it's
> privileged for a reason. Allowing an arbitrary user to enable
> physical WBINVD gives them more access to the hardware. Previously,
> this has only been enabled for guests supporting legacy PCI device
> assignment. In such cases it's necessary for proper guest execution.
> We therefore create a new KVM-VFIO virtual device. The user can add
> and remove VFIO groups to this device via file descriptors. KVM
> makes use of the VFIO external user interface to validate that the
> user has access to physical hardware and, for now, assumes the I/O
> is noncoherent. Eventually we'll add an interface to allow KVM to
> determine the conherency of the domain as noted in the TODO.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> v2: Patches 1-3 of v1 series remain the same, not resent
> - Fix cast warning from (int32_t *)u64 from get_user calls
> - Add a Kconfig variable to protect kvm_vfio_ops for archs
> not (yet) building virt/kvm/vfio.c
There might be another option for my particular need of this. The
device PCIe capability has a bit in the Device Control register that
enables a device to do NoSnoop transactions. Therefore it seems like by
clearing this bit on the physical device and emulating it as read-only
in the guest, we can prevent the NoSnoop at the device rather than at
the IOMMU. If we can prevent NoSnoop, then I don't think we need to
worry about things like WBINVD emulation in KVM. Let me work on this a
bit more before applying. Thanks,
Alex
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-03 20:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-10-01 20:15 [PATCH 0/4] KVM noncoherent DMA registration and VFIO pseudo device Alex Williamson
2013-10-01 20:15 ` [PATCH 1/4] kvm: Destroy & free KVM devices on release Alex Williamson
2013-10-01 20:15 ` [PATCH 2/4] kvm/x86: Convert iommu_flags to iommu_noncoherent Alex Williamson
2013-10-01 20:15 ` [PATCH 3/4] kvm: Create non-coherent DMA registeration Alex Williamson
2013-10-04 10:02 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2013-10-04 14:53 ` Alex Williamson
2013-10-01 20:15 ` [PATCH 4/4] kvm: Add VFIO device for handling IOMMU cache coherency Alex Williamson
2013-10-03 2:55 ` [PATCH v2 " Alex Williamson
2013-10-03 20:40 ` Alex Williamson [this message]
2013-10-04 12:24 ` [RFC PATCH] PPC: KVM: vfio kvm device: support spapr tce Alexey Kardashevskiy
2013-10-04 16:05 ` Alex Williamson
2013-10-05 1:52 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2013-10-05 3:36 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
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