From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
linux-audit@redhat.com,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] audit: Turn off TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT when there are no rules
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 12:31:22 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1392744682.2165.27.camel@flatline.rdu.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrX0GtSaLUB9UBeKsxOoVhiVyMzWrZTYt3O5He1Wdvz+1Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 2014-02-10 at 11:01 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 9:29 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> > On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> >> On 02/08, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>>
> >>> +void audit_inc_n_rules()
> >>> +{
> >>> + struct task_struct *p, *t;
> >>> +
> >>> + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> >>> + audit_n_rules++;
> >>> + smp_wmb();
> >>> + if (audit_n_rules == 1) {
> >>> + /*
> >>> + * We now have a rule; we need to hook syscall entry.
> >>> + */
> >>> + for_each_process_thread(p, t) {
> >>> + if (t->audit_context)
> >>> + set_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
> >>> + }
> >>> + }
> >>> + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> >>> +}
> >>> +
> >>> +void audit_dec_n_rules()
> >>> +{
> >>> + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> >>> + --audit_n_rules;
> >>> + BUG_ON(audit_n_rules < 0);
> >>> +
> >>> + /*
> >>> + * If audit_n_rules == 0, then __audit_syscall_exit will clear
> >>> + * TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT.
> >>> + */
> >>> +
> >>> + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> >>> +}
> >>
> >> To be honest, I do not understand why _dec_ takes tasklist_lock...
> >> And why _inc_ increments audit_n_rules under tasklist.
> >
> > Bah, incorrect leftover from last time.
> >
> >>
> >>> @@ -1528,6 +1562,25 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
> >>> context->filterkey = NULL;
> >>> }
> >>> tsk->audit_context = context;
> >>> +
> >>> + if (ACCESS_ONCE(audit_n_rules) == 0) {
> >>> + /*
> >>> + * Either this is the very first syscall by this process or
> >>> + * audit_dec_n_rules recently set audit_n_rules to zero.
> >>> + */
> >>> + smp_rmb();
> >>
> >> rmb() looks wrong, we need mb() to serialize ACCESS_ONCE() and
> >> clear_tsk_thread_flag().
> >
> > I clearly need to review the rules. I think you're right, though --
> > no barrier should be needed.
> >
> >>
> >> But, otoh, I think we do not need any barrier at all, we can rely on
> >> control dependency. See the recent 18c03c61444a21 "Documentation/
> >> memory-barriers.txt: Prohibit speculative writes".
> >>
> >>> + /* audit_inc_n_rules could increment audit_n_rules here... */
> >>> +
> >>> + clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
> >>> +
> >>> + smp_rmb();
> >>
> >> Again, I guess this should be mb() or smp_mb__after_clear_bit().
> >>
> >>
> >> And I still think this needs more changes. Once again, I do not think
> >> that, say, __audit_log_bprm_fcaps() should populate context->aux if
> >> !TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT, this list can grow indefinitely. Or __audit_signal_info()...
> >>
> >> Perhaps __audit_syscall_exit() should also set context->dummy?
> >
> > That would work.
> >
> > I'm still torn between trying to make it possible for things like
> > __audit_log_bprm_fcaps to start a syscall audit record in the middle
> > of a syscall or to just try to tighten up the current approach to the
> > point where it will work correctly.
Personally, I'd say just hand the next syscall_entry(), don't try to get
that race closed that fast... "The first syscall after a rule is added
will be audited"
> This is worse than I thought. Things like signal auditing can enter
> the audit system from outside of a syscall.
Not sure what you mean here. The only place I know of that we do
something like that is signal delivery to auditd itself, which is a
horrible nasty ugly ungodly terrible eat-your-babies hack... We'd have
to special case that hack to not pay attention to TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT or
audit_dummy_context(), but the rest might be fixable if we set/unset the
dummy spot...
> I don't think there's
> currently any way to tell whether you're in a syscall (when
> TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is clear) so getting this to work right would
> require arch help.
Don't understand why this is needed...
> I'll ask what people on the Fedora list think about just changing the
> default to -t task,never.
>
> --Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-02-18 17:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-02-08 21:06 [PATCH v3] audit: Turn off TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT when there are no rules Andy Lutomirski
2014-02-10 16:57 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-02-10 17:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-02-10 17:47 ` Steve Grubb
2014-02-10 18:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-02-10 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-02-10 19:12 ` Steve Grubb
2014-02-10 20:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-02-18 17:32 ` Eric Paris
2014-02-18 17:31 ` Eric Paris [this message]
2014-02-18 20:17 ` Eric Paris
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