public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: "gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"jwboyer@fedoraproject.org" <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 21:31:55 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1394746314.27846.4.camel@x230> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140313212647.7412aadf@alan.etchedpixels.co.uk>

[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8", Size: 903 bytes --]

On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 21:26 +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> > On the other hand, disabling CAP_SYS_RAWIO *definitely* breaks expected
> > functionality - firmware loading and the fibmap ioctl are probably the
> > most obvious. And changing the use of CAP_SYS_RAWIO potentially breaks
> > userspace expectations, so we're kind of stuck there.
> 
> Actually I know how to describe the problem better.
> 
> Whitelist v Blacklist.
> 
> Going around adding extra cases for CAP_SYS_RAWIO is a fails insecure
> model. Going around adding CAP_SYS_RAWIO || CAP_SYS_RAWIO_SEC is a 'fails
> secure' case.

We've already been through this. We can't add new capabilities. It
breaks existing userspace.

-- 
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
ÿôèº{.nÇ+‰·Ÿ®‰­†+%ŠËÿ±éݶ\x17¥Šwÿº{.nÇ+‰·¥Š{±þG«éÿŠ{ayº\x1dʇڙë,j\a­¢f£¢·hšïêÿ‘êçz_è®\x03(­éšŽŠÝ¢j"ú\x1a¶^[m§ÿÿ¾\a«þG«éÿ¢¸?™¨è­Ú&£ø§~á¶iO•æ¬z·švØ^\x14\x04\x1a¶^[m§ÿÿÃ\fÿ¶ìÿ¢¸?–I¥

      reply	other threads:[~2014-03-13 21:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-02-26 20:11 Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 19:02   ` Kees Cook
2014-03-31 14:49   ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down BAR access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2014-03-31 14:49   ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 22:41   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:47     ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-02-26 22:48     ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 18:48       ` Kees Cook
2014-02-26 21:11 ` Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Kees Cook
2014-02-26 22:21   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-19 17:42     ` Florian Weimer
2014-02-27 18:04 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 19:07   ` Greg KH
2014-02-27 19:11     ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 12:50       ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28  3:03   ` James Morris
2014-02-28  4:52     ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13  5:01     ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13  6:22       ` Kees Cook
2014-03-13  9:33         ` James Morris
2014-03-13 10:12           ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 15:54             ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 15:59           ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:24             ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:28               ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 21:32                 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:30               ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 23:21                 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14  1:57                   ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 12:22                     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 12:51                       ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:23                         ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:46                           ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:54                             ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:58                               ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 16:28                           ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 17:06                         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 18:11                           ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 19:24                             ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 20:37                               ` David Lang
2014-03-14 20:43                                 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:58                               ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:04                                 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:48                             ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:56                               ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:08                                 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:15                                   ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:31                                     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:52                                       ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-19 19:50                                       ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 23:18                                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-03-15  0:15                                     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-19 17:49                                     ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 20:16                                     ` Kees Cook
2014-03-20 14:47                                       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:55                                       ` tytso
2014-03-20 17:12                                         ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-20 18:13                                           ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:26             ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:31               ` Matthew Garrett [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1394746314.27846.4.camel@x230 \
    --to=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=jwboyer@fedoraproject.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body. 
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox