public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Philipp Kern <pkern@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 22:43:57 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1401331437.13555.38.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUcd44WqSOve4BS_fUfXPgk3KEfWrBv=5D1wi+YDnRVdA@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, 2014-05-28 at 19:27 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 7:23 PM, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, 2014-05-28 at 18:44 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
> >>
> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
> >>
> >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> >> ---
> >>  kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
> >>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> >> index f251a5e..7ccd9db 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> >> @@ -728,6 +728,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
> >>       return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
> >>  }
> >>
> >> +static bool audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
> >> +{
> >> +     int word, bit;
> >> +
> >> +     if (val > 0xffffffff)
> >> +             return false;
> >
> > Why is this necessary?
> 
> To avoid an integer overflow.  Admittedly, this particular overflow
> won't cause a crash, but it will cause incorrect results.

You know this code pre-dates git?  I admit, I'm shocked no one ever
noticed it before!  This is ANCIENT.  And clearly broken.

I'll likely ask Richard to add a WARN_ONCE() in both this place, and
below in word > AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE so we might know if we ever need a
larger bitmask to store syscall numbers....

It'd be nice if lib had a efficient bitmask implementation...

> >
> >> +
> >> +     word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
> >> +     if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
> >> +             return false;
> >
> > Since this covers it and it extensible...
> >
> >> +
> >> +     bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
> >> +
> >> +     return rule->mask[word] & bit;
> >
> > Returning an int as a bool creates worse code than just returning the
> > int.  (although in this case if the compiler chooses to inline it might
> > be smart enough not to actually convert this int to a bool and make
> > worse assembly...)   I'd suggest the function here return an int.  bools
> > usually make the assembly worse...
> 
> I'm ambivalent.  The right assembly would use flags on x86, not an int
> or a bool, and I don't know what the compiler will do.

Also, clearly X86_X32 was implemented without audit support, so we
shouldn't config it in.  What do you think of this?

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 25d2c6f..fa852e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK if X86_64
 	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
-	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL if !X86_X32
 
 config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	def_bool y



  reply	other threads:[~2014-05-29  2:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-05-29  1:43 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix auditsc DoS and mark it BROKEN Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-29  1:44 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-29  2:23   ` Eric Paris
2014-05-29  2:27     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-29  2:43       ` Eric Paris [this message]
2014-05-29  2:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-29  1:44 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] audit: Mark CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL BROKEN and update help text Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-29  2:09   ` Eric Paris
2014-05-29  2:40     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-29  2:54       ` Eric Paris
2014-05-29  3:01         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-29 13:05       ` Steve Grubb
2014-05-29 16:04         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-29 16:25           ` Steve Grubb
2014-05-29 16:46             ` Andy Lutomirski

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1401331437.13555.38.camel@localhost \
    --to=eparis@redhat.com \
    --cc=greg@kroah.com \
    --cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
    --cc=hpa@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=linux-audit@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=pkern@google.com \
    --cc=security@kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox