public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: "david@lang.hm" <david@lang.hm>
Cc: "keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"james.l.morris@oracle.com" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	"serge@hallyn.com" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 21:11:27 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1426540286.22371.29.camel@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.02.1503161333140.32001@nftneq.ynat.uz>

[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8", Size: 827 bytes --]

On Mon, 2015-03-16 at 13:35 -0700, David Lang wrote:
> On Mon, 16 Mar 2015, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > That's one implementation. Another is the kernel being stored on
> > non-volatile media.
> 
> Anything that encourages deploying systems that can't be upgraded to fix bugs 
> that are discovered is a problem.
> 
> This is an issue that the Internet of Things folks are just starting to notice, 
> and it's only going to get worse before it gets better.
> 
> How do you patch bugs on your non-volitile media? What keeps that mechansim from 
> being abused.

Nothing stops people from deploying kernels on non-volatile media right
now. This doesn't change anything.
ÿôèº{.nÇ+‰·Ÿ®‰­†+%ŠËÿ±éݶ\x17¥Šwÿº{.nÇ+‰·¥Š{±þG«éÿŠ{ayº\x1dʇڙë,j\a­¢f£¢·hšïêÿ‘êçz_è®\x03(­éšŽŠÝ¢j"ú\x1a¶^[m§ÿÿ¾\a«þG«éÿ¢¸?™¨è­Ú&£ø§~á¶iO•æ¬z·švØ^\x14\x04\x1a¶^[m§ÿÿÃ\fÿ¶ìÿ¢¸?–I¥

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-03-16 22:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-03-13 21:38 Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down register access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable loading of unverified images Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 21:36   ` Kees Cook
2015-03-16 21:40     ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2015-04-22 11:36   ` Dan Carpenter
2015-03-15  1:53 ` Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 14:45 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 18:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 20:07     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 20:35     ` David Lang
2015-03-16 20:57       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 21:11       ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2015-03-16 21:29     ` Kees Cook
2015-03-17 17:48       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-17 20:22       ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-17 20:42         ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-18 11:34           ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-16 21:54     ` Jiri Kosina
2015-03-18 13:24       ` joeyli

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1426540286.22371.29.camel@nebula.com \
    --to=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    --cc=david@lang.hm \
    --cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=james.l.morris@oracle.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body. 
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox