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From: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
To: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>,
	"Matthew Garrett" <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>,
	"Vojtech Pavlik" <vojtech@suse.cz>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 05/16] x86/efi: Get entropy through EFI random number generator protocol
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:11:44 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1438272704.11322.13.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1437056730-15247-6-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>

On Thu, 2015-07-16 at 22:25 +0800, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> To grab random numbers through EFI protocol as one of the entropies
> source of swsusp key, this patch adds the logic for accessing EFI RNG
> (random number generator) protocol that's introduced since UEFI 2.4.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_random.c | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/efi.h                   |  46 ++++++++
>  2 files changed, 239 insertions(+)

[...]

> @@ -2,6 +2,191 @@
>  
>  #include <linux/efi.h>
>  #include <asm/archrandom.h>
> +#include <asm/efi.h>
> +
> +static efi_status_t efi_locate_rng(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
> +				   void ***rng_handle)
> +{
> +	efi_guid_t rng_proto = EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL_GUID;
> +	unsigned long size = 0;
> +	efi_status_t status;
> +
> +	status = efi_call_early(locate_handle,
> +				EFI_LOCATE_BY_PROTOCOL,
> +				&rng_proto, NULL, &size, *rng_handle);
> +
> +	if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
> +		status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool,
> +					EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> +					size, (void **)rng_handle);
> +
> +		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> +			efi_printk(sys_table, " Failed to alloc mem for rng_handle");
> +			return status;
> +		}
> +
> +		status = efi_call_early(locate_handle,
> +					EFI_LOCATE_BY_PROTOCOL, &rng_proto,
> +					NULL, &size, *rng_handle);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> +		efi_printk(sys_table, " Failed to locate EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL");
> +		goto free_handle;
> +	}
> +
> +	return EFI_SUCCESS;
> +
> +free_handle:
> +	efi_call_early(free_pool, *rng_handle);
> +
> +	return status;
> +}

I would suggest setting *rng_handle = NULL at the beginning of this
function just because if we ever forget to set it that way in the caller
this free_pool call might do screwy things.


> +static bool efi_rng_supported(efi_system_table_t *sys_table)
> +{
> +	const struct efi_config *efi_early = __efi_early();
> +	u32 random = 0;
> +	efi_status_t status;
> +	void **rng_handle = NULL;
> +
> +	status = efi_locate_rng(sys_table, &rng_handle);
> +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	if (efi_early->is64)
> +		random = efi_rng_supported64(sys_table, rng_handle);
> +	else
> +		random = efi_rng_supported32(sys_table, rng_handle);
> +
> +	efi_call_early(free_pool, rng_handle);
> +
> +	return random;

Oops, 'random' isn't a bool but it should be.

> @@ -51,6 +236,14 @@ static unsigned long get_random_long(unsigned long entropy,
>  		use_i8254 = false;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (efi_rng_supported(sys_table)) {
> +		efi_printk(sys_table, " EFI_RNG");
> +		raw = efi_get_rng(sys_table);
> +		if (raw)
> +			random ^= raw;
> +		use_i8254 = false;
> +	}
> +
>  	if (use_i8254) {
>  		efi_printk(sys_table, " i8254");
>  		random ^= i8254();

Have you looked at the tradeoff in terms of boot time for building a key
array in 'unsigned long' chunks as opposed to passing the array and size
directly for the RNG protocol?


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-07-30 16:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-07-16 14:25 [RFC PATCH 00/16] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 01/16] PM / hibernate: define HMAC algorithm and digest size of swsusp Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-28 12:01   ` Pavel Machek
2015-07-31 10:08     ` joeyli
2015-07-31 12:49       ` Pavel Machek
2015-07-31 15:46         ` joeyli
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 02/16] x86/efi: Add get and set variable to EFI services pointer table Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-30 15:19   ` Matt Fleming
2015-07-31 10:14     ` joeyli
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 03/16] x86/boot: Public getting random boot function Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-28 12:21   ` Pavel Machek
2015-07-31 10:52     ` joeyli
2015-07-31 12:50       ` Pavel Machek
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 04/16] x86/efi: Generating random number in EFI stub Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-28 12:01   ` Pavel Machek
2015-07-31  9:06     ` joeyli
2015-07-30 15:37   ` Matt Fleming
2015-07-31  9:12     ` joeyli
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 05/16] x86/efi: Get entropy through EFI random number generator protocol Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-28 12:28   ` Pavel Machek
2015-07-31  9:58     ` joeyli
2015-07-31 12:01       ` Matt Fleming
2015-07-31 16:05         ` joeyli
2015-07-30 16:11   ` Matt Fleming [this message]
2015-07-31 14:59     ` joeyli
2015-07-31 15:01       ` joeyli
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging hibernate image Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-28 12:30   ` Pavel Machek
2015-07-31 10:56     ` joeyli
2015-07-30 16:20   ` Matt Fleming
2015-07-31 15:09     ` joeyli
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 07/16] efi: Public the function of transferring EFI status to kernel error Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-30 16:23   ` Matt Fleming
2015-07-31 15:11     ` joeyli
2015-08-02  0:23     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying swsusp key by setup data Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-30 16:30   ` Matt Fleming
2015-07-31 15:31     ` joeyli
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 09/16] PM / hibernate: Reserve swsusp key and earse footprints Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-28 12:35   ` Pavel Machek
2015-07-31 15:43     ` joeyli
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 10/16] PM / hibernate: Generate and verify signature of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 11/16] PM / hibernate: Avoid including swsusp key to hibernate image Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 12/16] PM / hibernate: Forward signature verifying result and key to image kernel Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 13/16] PM / hibernate: Add configuration to enforce signature verification Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 14/16] PM / hibernate: Allow user trigger swsusp key re-generating Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 15/16] PM / hibernate: Bypass verification logic on legacy BIOS Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-16 14:25 ` [RFC PATCH 16/16] PM / hibernate: Document signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-07-24 17:08 ` [RFC PATCH 00/16] Signature " Jiri Kosina
2015-07-24 20:08   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2015-07-28 12:09     ` Matt Fleming
2015-07-25 14:32   ` joeyli

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