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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
	Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@selhorst.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	chris.j.arges@canonical.com, seth.forshee@canonical.com,
	colin.king@canonical.com, josh@joshtriplett.org,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>,
	David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] tpm: seal with a policy
Date: Mon, 02 Nov 2015 07:48:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1446468522.2789.7.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1446306824-25175-1-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

On Sat, 2015-10-31 at 17:53 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Support for sealing with a policy.
> 
> Two new options for trusted keys:
> 
> * 'policydigest=': provide a policydigest for the seal operation.
> * 'policyhandle=': provide handle for a policy session for unsealing.

Please expand the patch description explaining the motivation for these
new options.  In what cases are they needed?  Are they system or session
policies? 

Mimi

> 
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig    |  1 +
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
>  include/keys/trusted-type.h |  3 +++
>  security/keys/trusted.c     | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> index 3b84a8b..bd86261 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM
>  	tristate "TPM Hardware Support"
>  	depends on HAS_IOMEM
>  	select SECURITYFS
> +	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
>  	---help---
>  	  If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which
>  	  implements the Trusted Computing Group's specification,
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> index b08a0b4..6f567c3 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> @@ -463,6 +463,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  	}
> 
> +	if (options->policydigest_len > hash_digest_size[options->hash])
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
>  	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
>  	if (rc)
>  		return rc;
> @@ -488,8 +491,17 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> 
>  	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
>  	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
> -	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH);
> -	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); /* policy digest size */
> +
> +	if (options->policydigest_len) {
> +		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
> +		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
> +		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
> +			       options->policydigest_len);
> +	} else {
> +		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH);
> +		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
> +	}
> +
>  	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_NULL);
>  	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
> 
> @@ -617,7 +629,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>  		return rc;
> 
>  	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle);
> -	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
> +	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf,
> +			     options->policyhandle ?
> +			     options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW,
>  			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
>  			     0 /* session_attributes */,
>  			     options->blobauth /* hmac */,
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> index a6a1008..e4beeca 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> @@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ struct trusted_key_options {
>  	unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
>  	int pcrlock;
>  	uint32_t hash;
> +	uint32_t policydigest_len;
> +	unsigned char *policydigest;
> +	uint32_t policyhandle;
>  };
> 
>  extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
> index 7a87bcd..ea043ff 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
> @@ -713,6 +713,8 @@ enum {
>  	Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
>  	Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable,
>  	Opt_hash,
> +	Opt_policydigest,
> +	Opt_policyhandle,
>  };
> 
>  static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
> @@ -726,6 +728,8 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
>  	{Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"},
>  	{Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"},
>  	{Opt_hash, "hash=%s"},
> +	{Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"},
> +	{Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"},
>  	{Opt_err, NULL}
>  };
> 
> @@ -804,6 +808,17 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>  			if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST ||
>  			    (!res && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1))
>  				return -EINVAL;
> +		case Opt_policydigest:
> +			opt->policydigest_len = strlen(args[0].from);
> +			opt->policydigest = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
> +			if (!opt->policydigest)
> +				return -ENOMEM;
> +			break;
> +		case Opt_policyhandle:
> +			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
> +			if (res < 0)
> +				return -EINVAL;
> +			opt->policyhandle = handle;
>  			break;
>  		default:
>  			return -EINVAL;
> @@ -897,6 +912,13 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>  	return options;
>  }
> 
> +static void trusted_options_free(struct trusted_key_options *options)
> +{
> +	if (options->policydigest)
> +		kfree(options->policydigest);
> +	kfree(options);
> +}
> +
>  static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
>  {
>  	struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
> @@ -1003,7 +1025,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
>  		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
>  out:
>  	kfree(datablob);
> -	kfree(options);
> +	trusted_options_free(options);
>  	if (!ret)
>  		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
>  	else
> @@ -1091,7 +1113,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  	call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
>  out:
>  	kfree(datablob);
> -	kfree(new_o);
> +	trusted_options_free(new_o);
>  	return ret;
>  }
> 



  reply	other threads:[~2015-11-02 12:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-10-31 15:53 [PATCH RFC] tpm: seal with a policy Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-11-02 12:48 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2015-11-02 17:44   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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