From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753205AbcAGPcP (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Jan 2016 10:32:15 -0500 Received: from e23smtp02.au.ibm.com ([202.81.31.144]:45695 "EHLO e23smtp02.au.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752314AbcAGPcM (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Jan 2016 10:32:12 -0500 X-IBM-Helo: d23dlp03.au.ibm.com X-IBM-MailFrom: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com X-IBM-RcptTo: keyrings@vger.kernel.org;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Message-ID: <1452180676.2890.21.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring From: Mimi Zohar To: David Howells Cc: petkan@mip-labs.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Thu, 07 Jan 2016 10:31:16 -0500 In-Reply-To: <24185.1452126854@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <20160106134525.15633.73582.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <24185.1452126854@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.12.11 (3.12.11-1.fc21) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-MML: disable X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 16010715-0005-0000-0000-0000030C4B47 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote: > David Howells wrote: > > > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893: > > > > Author: Petko Manolov > > Date: Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200 > > IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings > > > > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional > > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of > > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the > > system trusted keyring. > > > > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any* > > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring. > > > > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is > > quite the right solution. > > Please apply this to security/next. The only upstreamed trusted keyrings are the system keyring, which does not permit user space to write to the keyring, and the 3 IMA keyrings. For those systems without the Kconfig IMA_MOK_KEYRING option enabled, get_ima_mok_keyring() does not change the existing behavior. For systems with IMA_MOK_KEYRING enabled, keys being added to the IMA keyring, can be validated against the system keyring or the IMA MOK keyring. Mimi