From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756749AbcAJN1x (ORCPT ); Sun, 10 Jan 2016 08:27:53 -0500 Received: from e23smtp01.au.ibm.com ([202.81.31.143]:45844 "EHLO e23smtp01.au.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756154AbcAJN1v (ORCPT ); Sun, 10 Jan 2016 08:27:51 -0500 X-IBM-Helo: d23dlp01.au.ibm.com X-IBM-MailFrom: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com X-IBM-RcptTo: keyrings@vger.kernel.org;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Message-ID: <1452432410.2651.40.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring From: Mimi Zohar To: James Morris Cc: David Howells , petkan@mip-labs.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 08:26:50 -0500 In-Reply-To: References: <20160106134525.15633.73582.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <24185.1452126854@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1452180676.2890.21.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.12.11 (3.12.11-1.fc21) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-MML: disable X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 16011013-1618-0000-0000-000003747F64 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sun, 2016-01-10 at 21:36 +1100, James Morris wrote: > On Thu, 7 Jan 2016, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote: > > > David Howells wrote: > > > > > > > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893: > > > > > > > > Author: Petko Manolov > > > > Date: Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200 > > > > IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings > > > > > > > > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional > > > > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of > > > > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the > > > > system trusted keyring. > > > > > > > > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any* > > > > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring. > > > > > > > > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is > > > > quite the right solution. > > > > > > Please apply this to security/next. > > > > The only upstreamed trusted keyrings are the system keyring, which does > > not permit user space to write to the keyring, and the 3 IMA keyrings. > > > > For those systems without the Kconfig IMA_MOK_KEYRING option enabled, > > get_ima_mok_keyring() does not change the existing behavior. For > > systems with IMA_MOK_KEYRING enabled, keys being added to the IMA > > keyring, can be validated against the system keyring or the IMA MOK > > keyring. > > > > Is this a NAK on the patch? Yes Mimi