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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	petkan@mip-labs.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/15] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 21:43:46 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1452566626.4776.37.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <26351.1452559103@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Tue, 2016-01-12 at 00:38 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > Back in November, Mehmet Kayaalp posted a patch for safely adding
> > additional keys to the system keyring post build and a tool for
> > re-signing the kernel.
> > 
> > https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg03679.html
> 
> That's irrelevant to this particular discussion.

Not really.  The discussion centers around the system keyring and the
origin of the keys on it.  These patches safely allow additional keys to
be added post-build to the system keyring.

> And, yes, I should deal with
> his patch.

Thank you.

Mimi

  reply	other threads:[~2016-01-12  2:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-08 18:33 [RFC PATCH 00/15] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings David Howells
2016-01-08 18:33 ` [RFC PATCH 01/15] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring David Howells
2016-01-08 18:33 ` [RFC PATCH 02/15] X.509: Don't treat self-signed keys specially David Howells
2016-01-08 18:33 ` [RFC PATCH 03/15] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content David Howells
2016-01-08 18:33 ` [RFC PATCH 04/15] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring David Howells
2016-01-08 18:33 ` [RFC PATCH 05/15] KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a key David Howells
2016-01-08 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH 06/15] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring David Howells
2016-01-08 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH 07/15] KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key David Howells
2016-01-08 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH 08/15] KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct David Howells
2016-01-08 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH 09/15] X.509: Retain the key verification data David Howells
2016-01-08 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH 10/15] X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier David Howells
2016-01-08 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH 11/15] PKCS#7: Make the signature a pointer rather than embedding it David Howells
2016-01-08 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH 12/15] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file David Howells
2016-01-08 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH 13/15] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() David Howells
2016-01-08 18:35 ` [RFC PATCH 14/15] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() David Howells
2016-01-08 18:35 ` [RFC PATCH 15/15] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED David Howells
2016-01-08 18:54 ` [RFC PATCH 00/15] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings Mimi Zohar
2016-01-08 19:18   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-12  0:38     ` David Howells
2016-01-12  2:43       ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2016-01-12  0:37   ` David Howells

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