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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	petkan@mip-labs.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 02/20] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 14:31:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1453318283.2858.27.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160119113041.23238.44728.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Tue, 2016-01-19 at 11:30 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Add the following:
> 
>  (1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about
>      blacklisted certificates and signatures.
> 
>  (2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a
>      blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string.  The key accepts
>      no payload.

>  (3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel
>      at build time.  This is done by setting
>      CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes
>      that are in the form:
> 
> 	"<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>"
> 
>      where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must
>      include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size.

Is the output of "keyctl print" the hex string representation?  Update
keys documentation?

> The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING.
> 
> Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed:
> 
> 	root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist
> 	Keyring
> 	 723359729 ---lswrv      0     0  keyring: .blacklist
> 	 676257228 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46
> 
> The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be
> possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database.

When loading the UEFI blacklist database is enabled, it should be
configurable.

> In the future, it should also be made possible to load blacklisted
> asymmetric keys in here too.

Please update to reflect patch 3/20 "X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be
blacklisted" adds this support.

Mimi

  reply	other threads:[~2016-01-20 19:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-19 11:30 [RFC PATCH 00/20] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings [ver #2] David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 01/20] KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a key " David Howells
2016-01-20 18:58   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:30   ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring " David Howells
2016-01-20 19:31   ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2016-01-20 20:26   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:27   ` David Howells
2016-02-08 13:34     ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 13:55     ` David Howells
2016-02-08 15:03       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 15:53       ` How to add additional blacklist entries? David Howells
2016-02-08 16:32         ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 16:43         ` David Howells
2016-02-08 19:28           ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-09 10:42           ` David Howells
2016-02-10 14:07             ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 14:55     ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring [ver #2] David Howells
2016-02-08 16:39       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:48       ` David Howells
2016-02-03 15:29   ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 03/20] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted " David Howells
2016-01-20 20:33   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:46   ` David Howells
2016-02-05 16:16     ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 04/20] X.509: Don't treat self-signed keys specially " David Howells
2016-01-20 20:40   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 05/20] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 06/20] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 07/20] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-29 15:49   ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 08/20] KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 09/20] KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 10/20] X.509: Retain the key verification data " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 11/20] X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 12/20] PKCS#7: Make the signature a pointer rather than embedding it " David Howells
2016-02-08 12:00   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:56   ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 13/20] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 14/20] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 15/20] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 16/20] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 17/20] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 18/20] IMA: Use the system blacklist keyring " David Howells
2016-02-10 19:12   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:58   ` David Howells
2016-02-19 12:16     ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 19/20] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 20/20] IMA: Replace the .ima_mok keyring with the secondary system keyring " David Howells
2016-01-20 17:24 ` [RFC PATCH 00/20] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings " Petko Manolov
2016-01-20 18:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:47 ` David Howells
2016-02-03 15:56 ` David Howells

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