* [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits.
@ 2016-02-04 22:06 Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long() Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:29 ` [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits Kees Cook
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Cashman @ 2016-02-04 22:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: linux, akpm, keescook, tytso, arnd, gregkh, catalin.marinas,
will.deacon, ralf, benh, paulus, mpe, davem, tglx, mingo, hpa,
x86, viro, nnk, jeffv, salyzyn, Daniel Cashman
Upstream commit: d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 added the
ability to choose from a range of values to use for entropy count in
generating the random offset to the mmap_base address. The
maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86 systems,
but this value could be increased further, requiring more than the 32
bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already possible
for arm64. Add a new function: get_random_long() which more naturally
fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates exactly the
same as get_random_int().
Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
randomization.
Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
appropriate.
Daniel Cashman (2):
drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long().
use get_random_long().
arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
arch/mips/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 4 ++--
arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++---
drivers/char/random.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +-
include/linux/random.h | 1 +
10 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
2.7.0.rc3.207.g0ac5344
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long().
2016-02-04 22:06 [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits Daniel Cashman
@ 2016-02-04 22:06 ` Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:06 ` [PATCH 2/2] use get_random_long() Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:29 ` [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits Kees Cook
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Cashman @ 2016-02-04 22:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: linux, akpm, keescook, tytso, arnd, gregkh, catalin.marinas,
will.deacon, ralf, benh, paulus, mpe, davem, tglx, mingo, hpa,
x86, viro, nnk, jeffv, salyzyn, Daniel Cashman
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/random.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index d0da5d8..b583e53 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1819,6 +1819,28 @@ unsigned int get_random_int(void)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int);
/*
+ * Same as get_random_int(), but returns unsigned long.
+ */
+unsigned long get_random_long(void)
+{
+ __u32 *hash;
+ unsigned long ret;
+
+ if (arch_get_random_long(&ret))
+ return ret;
+
+ hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+
+ hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy();
+ md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
+ ret = *(unsigned long *)hash;
+ put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long);
+
+/*
* randomize_range() returns a start address such that
*
* [...... <range> .....]
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index a75840c..9c29122 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
#endif
unsigned int get_random_int(void);
+unsigned long get_random_long(void);
unsigned long randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len);
u32 prandom_u32(void);
--
2.7.0.rc3.207.g0ac5344
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] use get_random_long().
2016-02-04 22:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long() Daniel Cashman
@ 2016-02-04 22:06 ` Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:38 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Cashman @ 2016-02-04 22:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: linux, akpm, keescook, tytso, arnd, gregkh, catalin.marinas,
will.deacon, ralf, benh, paulus, mpe, davem, tglx, mingo, hpa,
x86, viro, nnk, jeffv, salyzyn, Daniel Cashman
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to get_random_long(). Also address shifting bug which, in
case of x86 removed entropy mask for mmap_rnd_bits values > 31 bits.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
---
arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
arch/mips/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 4 ++--
arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++---
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +-
8 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
index 4b4058d..66353ca 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
{
unsigned long rnd;
- rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
+ rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
index 4c893b5..232f787 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
@@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
- rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1);
+ rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1);
else
#endif
- rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
+ rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
diff --git a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c b/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
index 5c81fdd..3530376 100644
--- a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
{
unsigned long rnd;
- rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int();
+ rnd = get_random_long();
rnd <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
if (TASK_IS_32BIT_ADDR)
rnd &= 0xfffffful;
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
static inline unsigned long brk_rnd(void)
{
- unsigned long rnd = get_random_int();
+ unsigned long rnd = get_random_long();
rnd = rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
/* 8MB for 32bit, 256MB for 64bit */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
index dccc87e..3c5736e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
@@ -1768,9 +1768,9 @@ static inline unsigned long brk_rnd(void)
/* 8MB for 32bit, 1GB for 64bit */
if (is_32bit_task())
- rnd = (long)(get_random_int() % (1<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT)));
+ rnd = (get_random_long() % (1UL<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT)));
else
- rnd = (long)(get_random_int() % (1<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT)));
+ rnd = (get_random_long() % (1UL<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT)));
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
index 0f0502e..4087705 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
/* 8MB for 32bit, 1GB for 64bit */
if (is_32bit_task())
- rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT));
+ rnd = get_random_long() % (1<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT));
else
- rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT));
+ rnd = get_random_long() % (1UL<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT));
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c
index c690c8e..b489e97 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
unsigned long rnd = 0UL;
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
- unsigned long val = get_random_int();
+ unsigned long val = get_random_long();
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
rnd = (val % (1UL << (23UL-PAGE_SHIFT)));
else
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index 96bd1e2..72bb52f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -71,12 +71,12 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
if (mmap_is_ia32())
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
- rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1);
+ rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1);
#else
- rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
+ rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
#endif
else
- rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
+ rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index 051ea48..7d914c6 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
- random_variable = (unsigned long) get_random_int();
+ random_variable = get_random_long();
random_variable &= STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
--
2.7.0.rc3.207.g0ac5344
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits.
2016-02-04 22:06 [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long() Daniel Cashman
@ 2016-02-04 22:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-24 20:40 ` Daniel Cashman
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2016-02-04 22:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Cashman, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Russell King - ARM Linux, Theodore Ts'o, Arnd Bergmann,
Greg KH, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Ralf Baechle,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, Paul Mackerras, Michael Ellerman,
David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
x86@kernel.org, Al Viro, Nick Kralevich, Jeffrey Vander Stoep,
Mark Salyzyn
On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 2:06 PM, Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> wrote:
> Upstream commit: d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 added the
> ability to choose from a range of values to use for entropy count in
> generating the random offset to the mmap_base address. The
> maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86 systems,
> but this value could be increased further, requiring more than the 32
> bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already possible
> for arm64. Add a new function: get_random_long() which more naturally
> fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates exactly the
> same as get_random_int().
>
> Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
> that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
> overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
> uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
> mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
> randomization.
>
> Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
> appropriate.
>
> Daniel Cashman (2):
> drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long().
> use get_random_long().
>
> arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
> arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
> arch/mips/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
> arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 4 ++--
> arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
> arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++---
> drivers/char/random.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/random.h | 1 +
> 10 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Thanks for fixing this!
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] use get_random_long().
2016-02-04 22:06 ` [PATCH 2/2] use get_random_long() Daniel Cashman
@ 2016-02-04 22:38 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2016-02-04 22:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Cashman, Andrew Morton, Theodore Ts'o
Cc: LKML, Russell King - ARM Linux, Arnd Bergmann, Greg KH,
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Ralf Baechle,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, Paul Mackerras, Michael Ellerman,
David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
x86@kernel.org, Al Viro, Nick Kralevich, Jeffrey Vander Stoep,
Mark Salyzyn
On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 2:06 PM, Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> wrote:
> Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
> with calls to get_random_long(). Also address shifting bug which, in
> case of x86 removed entropy mask for mmap_rnd_bits values > 31 bits.
I wonder if randomize_range() should be using get_random_long()? Right
now, a large range would get truncated:
unsigned long
randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
{
unsigned long range = end - len - start;
if (end <= start + len)
return 0;
return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
}
For example, randomize_range(0, 0x7ffffffff000, 4096) will never
return 0x700000000000... no current callers use a >MAX_UINT range, so
nothing is bugged now, but it seems like we should fix this too
(separately)?
-Kees
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
> ---
> arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
> arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
> arch/mips/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
> arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 4 ++--
> arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
> arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++---
> fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +-
> 8 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
> index 4b4058d..66353ca 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
> {
> unsigned long rnd;
>
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
> + rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
>
> return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
> index 4c893b5..232f787 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1);
> + rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1);
> else
> #endif
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
> + rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
> return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c b/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
> index 5c81fdd..3530376 100644
> --- a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
> {
> unsigned long rnd;
>
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int();
> + rnd = get_random_long();
> rnd <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
> if (TASK_IS_32BIT_ADDR)
> rnd &= 0xfffffful;
> @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
>
> static inline unsigned long brk_rnd(void)
> {
> - unsigned long rnd = get_random_int();
> + unsigned long rnd = get_random_long();
>
> rnd = rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
> /* 8MB for 32bit, 256MB for 64bit */
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
> index dccc87e..3c5736e 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
> @@ -1768,9 +1768,9 @@ static inline unsigned long brk_rnd(void)
>
> /* 8MB for 32bit, 1GB for 64bit */
> if (is_32bit_task())
> - rnd = (long)(get_random_int() % (1<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT)));
> + rnd = (get_random_long() % (1UL<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT)));
> else
> - rnd = (long)(get_random_int() % (1<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT)));
> + rnd = (get_random_long() % (1UL<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT)));
>
> return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
> index 0f0502e..4087705 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
>
> /* 8MB for 32bit, 1GB for 64bit */
> if (is_32bit_task())
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT));
> + rnd = get_random_long() % (1<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT));
> else
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT));
> + rnd = get_random_long() % (1UL<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT));
>
> return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
> diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c
> index c690c8e..b489e97 100644
> --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c
> +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c
> @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
> unsigned long rnd = 0UL;
>
> if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
> - unsigned long val = get_random_int();
> + unsigned long val = get_random_long();
> if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
> rnd = (val % (1UL << (23UL-PAGE_SHIFT)));
> else
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
> index 96bd1e2..72bb52f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -71,12 +71,12 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
>
> if (mmap_is_ia32())
> #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1);
> + rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1);
> #else
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
> + rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
> #endif
> else
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
> + rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
>
> return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
> diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> index 051ea48..7d914c6 100644
> --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> @@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
>
> if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
> !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
> - random_variable = (unsigned long) get_random_int();
> + random_variable = get_random_long();
> random_variable &= STACK_RND_MASK;
> random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
> --
> 2.7.0.rc3.207.g0ac5344
>
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits.
2016-02-04 22:29 ` [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits Kees Cook
@ 2016-02-24 20:40 ` Daniel Cashman
2016-02-24 21:50 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Cashman @ 2016-02-24 20:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Russell King - ARM Linux, Theodore Ts'o, Arnd Bergmann,
Greg KH, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Ralf Baechle,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, Paul Mackerras, Michael Ellerman,
David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
x86@kernel.org, Al Viro, Nick Kralevich, Jeffrey Vander Stoep,
Mark Salyzyn
On 02/04/2016 02:29 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 2:06 PM, Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> wrote:
>> Upstream commit: d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 added the
>> ability to choose from a range of values to use for entropy count in
>> generating the random offset to the mmap_base address. The
>> maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86 systems,
>> but this value could be increased further, requiring more than the 32
>> bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already possible
>> for arm64. Add a new function: get_random_long() which more naturally
>> fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates exactly the
>> same as get_random_int().
>>
>> Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
>> that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
>> overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
>> uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
>> mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
>> randomization.
>>
>> Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
>> appropriate.
>>
>> Daniel Cashman (2):
>> drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long().
>> use get_random_long().
>>
>> arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
>> arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
>> arch/mips/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
>> arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 4 ++--
>> arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
>> arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c | 2 +-
>> arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++---
>> drivers/char/random.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>> fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +-
>> include/linux/random.h | 1 +
>> 10 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> Thanks for fixing this!
>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> -Kees
>
This has now been in linux-next for awhile. Could we please submit this
for the 4.5 rc window so that it fixes the issue in the final 4.5
release? Sorry if this is a protocol breach, but I'm not sure what the
best way is for me to indicate that this is a "fix" that should go out
in the same release as the original feature.
Thank You,
Dan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits.
2016-02-24 20:40 ` Daniel Cashman
@ 2016-02-24 21:50 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2016-02-24 21:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Daniel Cashman, LKML, Russell King - ARM Linux, Theodore Ts'o,
Arnd Bergmann, Greg KH, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon,
Ralf Baechle, benh@kernel.crashing.org, Paul Mackerras,
Michael Ellerman, David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
H. Peter Anvin, x86@kernel.org, Al Viro, Nick Kralevich,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Mark Salyzyn
On Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 12:40 PM, Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> wrote:
> On 02/04/2016 02:29 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 2:06 PM, Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> wrote:
>>> Upstream commit: d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 added the
>>> ability to choose from a range of values to use for entropy count in
>>> generating the random offset to the mmap_base address. The
>>> maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86 systems,
>>> but this value could be increased further, requiring more than the 32
>>> bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already possible
>>> for arm64. Add a new function: get_random_long() which more naturally
>>> fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates exactly the
>>> same as get_random_int().
>>>
>>> Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
>>> that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
>>> overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
>>> uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
>>> mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
>>> randomization.
>>>
>>> Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
>>> appropriate.
>>>
>>> Daniel Cashman (2):
>>> drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long().
>>> use get_random_long().
>>>
>>> arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
>>> arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
>>> arch/mips/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
>>> arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 4 ++--
>>> arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
>>> arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c | 2 +-
>>> arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++---
>>> drivers/char/random.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +-
>>> include/linux/random.h | 1 +
>>> 10 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>>
>> Thanks for fixing this!
>>
>> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>>
>> -Kees
>>
>
> This has now been in linux-next for awhile. Could we please submit this
> for the 4.5 rc window so that it fixes the issue in the final 4.5
> release? Sorry if this is a protocol breach, but I'm not sure what the
> best way is for me to indicate that this is a "fix" that should go out
> in the same release as the original feature.
Yes please! :) Andrew, can you push these for 4.5? Best to keep the
feature from releasing broken.
Thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2016-02-24 21:50 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2016-02-04 22:06 [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] drivers: char: random: Add get_random_long() Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:06 ` [PATCH 2/2] use get_random_long() Daniel Cashman
2016-02-04 22:38 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-04 22:29 ` [PATCH 0/2] Fix mmap_base entropy for >31 bits Kees Cook
2016-02-24 20:40 ` Daniel Cashman
2016-02-24 21:50 ` Kees Cook
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