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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	petkan@mip-labs.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 03/20] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted [ver #2]
Date: Fri, 05 Feb 2016 11:16:19 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1454688979.2648.97.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <25815.1454514412@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

Hi David,

On Wed, 2016-02-03 at 15:46 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > > Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted based on their TBS hash. 
> > 
> > What is the TBS hash?  This doesn't seem to be the key identifier.
> 
> It's the TBSCertificate hash (I'll change to calling it that in the patch
> description).  "TBS" stands for "To Be Signed".  This is what is hashed for
> the signature to be generated upon - so it's something we have to expend
> resources calculating anyway.
> 
> The reason I'm using this is this is what UEFI puts into its blacklist.  See:
> 
> 	http://uefi.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/uefi-24-review-part-13-hash-of.html
> 
> To quote:
> 
> 	Now, in the UEFI 2.4 specification, three new types of signatures for
> 	the black list were added. Specifically, the various recommended forms
> 	of the To-Be-Signed hash value (160, 256 and 512-bits) which are
> 	created during the creation of a certificate could be added to the
> 	black list instead of the certificate itself.
> 
> > The cert associated with this key identifier is loaded onto the .ima
> > keyring.
> 
> We could also check that.  There's no requirement that we only check the TBS -
> but the TBS hash is something we must check.

Ok, but before "IMA: Use the system blacklist keyring" patch, this needs
to be addressed.

> I wonder if I should mark the blacklist key as to what the value it holds
> should be checked against.  There's a number of different things we could put
> in there:
> 
>  (1) TBSCertificate hash.
> 
>  (2) Subject Key Identifier content.
> 
>  (3) Authenticode Binary hash (for PE files).
> 
>  (4) PKCS#7 component digest.

Ok

> > eg:  openssl x509 -in <pathname> -inform DER -notext -out
> > 
> > <snip>
> > 
> >         X509v3 extensions:
> >             X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 
> > 
> > 71:12:39:B3:AB:E6:8D:BF:70:E7:26:DE:C8:4A:3F:5F:17:EF:00:6C
> 
> Note that this isn't a mandatoryy field and if it's not present, we have no way
> to calculate it as there's no one standard-defined method.

The hex string appears when displaying the keys.  For example, 
 keyctl show %keyring:.ima shows:

734429129 --als--v      0     0   \_ asymmetric: : local: signing key:
711239b3abe68dbf70e726dec84a3f5f17ef006c

Mimi

  reply	other threads:[~2016-02-05 16:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-19 11:30 [RFC PATCH 00/20] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings [ver #2] David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 01/20] KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a key " David Howells
2016-01-20 18:58   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:30   ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring " David Howells
2016-01-20 19:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-20 20:26   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:27   ` David Howells
2016-02-08 13:34     ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 13:55     ` David Howells
2016-02-08 15:03       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 15:53       ` How to add additional blacklist entries? David Howells
2016-02-08 16:32         ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 16:43         ` David Howells
2016-02-08 19:28           ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-09 10:42           ` David Howells
2016-02-10 14:07             ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 14:55     ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring [ver #2] David Howells
2016-02-08 16:39       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:48       ` David Howells
2016-02-03 15:29   ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 03/20] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted " David Howells
2016-01-20 20:33   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:46   ` David Howells
2016-02-05 16:16     ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 04/20] X.509: Don't treat self-signed keys specially " David Howells
2016-01-20 20:40   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 05/20] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 06/20] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 07/20] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-29 15:49   ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 08/20] KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 09/20] KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 10/20] X.509: Retain the key verification data " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 11/20] X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 12/20] PKCS#7: Make the signature a pointer rather than embedding it " David Howells
2016-02-08 12:00   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:56   ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 13/20] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 14/20] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 15/20] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 16/20] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 17/20] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 18/20] IMA: Use the system blacklist keyring " David Howells
2016-02-10 19:12   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:58   ` David Howells
2016-02-19 12:16     ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 19/20] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 20/20] IMA: Replace the .ima_mok keyring with the secondary system keyring " David Howells
2016-01-20 17:24 ` [RFC PATCH 00/20] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings " Petko Manolov
2016-01-20 18:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:47 ` David Howells
2016-02-03 15:56 ` David Howells

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