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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2]
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2016 11:15:00 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1457453700.5321.159.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2819.1457451134@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Tue, 2016-03-08 at 15:32 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > > The problem boils down to a difficulty in concocting a name that describes a
> > > complex situation that may change depending on the configuration.  I can make
> > > it "restrict_link_by_any_system_trusted" if you'd prefer.
> > > 
> > > That's why I want "system trusted keyrings" to refer to the builtin and the
> > > secondary - *and* an extra UEFI keyring if we grow one of those.  It's a
> > > collection of related keyrings.
> > 
> > Sigh, this is the same discussion we've had for years.
> 
> No, it isn't.

Good!

> > The UEFI keys should not be trusted to validate the certificates being added
> > to the IMA keyring.
> 
> A machine-security (e.g. UEFI) keyring will conceivably live in
> certs/system_keyring.c and only be enabled if CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRINGS=y
> and, say, CONFIG_MACHINE_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y.  I didn't say that IMA necessarily
> has to use it.

Ok.

> What we need to do is define a set of functions allow IMA to get the
> restrictions it wants, depending on configuration.  In the code I currently
> have, I think we have those:
> 
> 	restrict_link_reject

Option 1

> 	restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted

Option 2

> 	restrict_link_by_system_trusted

By renaming the system keyring to builtin, this is where it becomes
unclear what is included by restrict_link_by_system_trusted - builtin
and secondary, or builtin, secondary, and UEFI.

> If you really want, I can add a restrict_link_for_ima in there, but I'd rather
> not if IMA can use whichever of the above three most suits it.  How about:
> 
> 	restrict_link_reject
> 	restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
> 	restrict_link_by_builtin_or_secondary_trusted

Option 3 - "restrict_link_by_builtin_or_secondary_trusted" is a bit
wordy, but there wouldn't be any confusion.

Mimi

> > Neither should the keys on the secondary keyring, unless specifically IMA
> > Kconfig enabled, be used to validate the certificates being added to the IMA
> > keyring.
> 
> Yes.
> 
> David
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2016-03-08 16:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-04 15:00 [RFC PATCH 00/12] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings [ver #2] David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct key * to use " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically " David Howells
2016-03-08  2:05   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 13:13   ` David Howells
2016-03-08 14:06     ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 14:31     ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 14:43     ` David Howells
2016-03-08 15:09       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 15:32       ` David Howells
2016-03-08 16:15         ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok " David Howells
2016-03-08  2:26   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 13:08   ` David Howells
2016-03-08 14:12     ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 14:14     ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 14:38       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 14:44     ` David Howells
2016-03-08 15:48       ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 16:07     ` David Howells
2016-03-08 16:37       ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 22:05         ` Mimi Zohar

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