From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
Return-Path: <linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org>
Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand
	id S1758418AbcCaVYZ (ORCPT <rfc822;w@1wt.eu>);
	Thu, 31 Mar 2016 17:24:25 -0400
Received: from e28smtp03.in.ibm.com ([125.16.236.3]:50186 "EHLO
	e28smtp03.in.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org
	with ESMTP id S1757390AbcCaVYU (ORCPT
	<rfc822;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>);
	Thu, 31 Mar 2016 17:24:20 -0400
X-IBM-Helo: d28relay01.in.ibm.com
X-IBM-MailFrom: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
X-IBM-RcptTo: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Message-ID: <1459459442.2657.51.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>,
        Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>, Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>,
        Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
        Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
        Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2016 17:24:02 -0400
In-Reply-To: <1459199662-16558-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
References: <1459199662-16558-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
	 <1459199662-16558-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
X-Mailer: Evolution 3.12.11 (3.12.11-1.fc21) 
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-TM-AS-MML: disable
x-cbid: 16033121-0009-0000-0000-00000BB73BDF
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org>
X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 14:14 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:

> +static const char *id_str[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> +	[READING_FIRMWARE] = "firmware",
> +	[READING_MODULE] = "kernel module",
> +	[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = "kexec image",
> +	[READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = "kexec initramfs",
> +	[READING_POLICY] = "security policy",
> +};
> +
> +static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> +{
> +	struct super_block *load_root;
> +	const char *origin;
> +
> +	if (id < 0 || id >= READING_MAX_ID)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +

The kernel_read_file_id enumeration starts at 1.

> +	origin = id_str[id];
> +	if (!origin) {
> +		origin = "unknown";

Right, all the entries in the kernel_read_file_id enumeration are
currently listed in id_str.  Checking origin is needed for when id_str[]
isn't kept in sync with the enumeration.

Looks good!

Mimi