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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #3]
Date: Tue, 05 Apr 2016 20:37:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1459903039.3166.8.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160309111932.28811.28906.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Wed, 2016-03-09 at 11:19 +0000, David Howells wrote:

> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> +/**
> + * restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted - Restrict keyring
> + *   addition by both builtin and secondary keyrings
> + *
> + * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
> + * being vouched for by a key in either the built-in or the secondary system
> + * keyrings.
> + */
> +int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
> +	struct key *keyring,
> +	const struct key_type *type,
> +	const union key_payload *payload)
> +{
> +	/* If we have a secondary trusted keyring, then that contains a link
> +	 * through to the builtin keyring and the search will follow that link.
> +	 */
> +	if (type == &key_type_keyring &&
> +	    keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
> +	    payload == &builtin_trusted_keys->payload)
> +		/* Allow the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary */
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	return restrict_link_by_signature(builtin_trusted_keys, type, payload);

Shouldn't thi be secondary_trusted_keys?

Mimi

> +}
> +#endif

  reply	other threads:[~2016-04-06  0:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-09 11:18 [RFC PATCH 00/12] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings [ver #3] David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct key * to use " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically " David Howells
2016-04-06  0:37   ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2016-04-06 16:12     ` David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok " David Howells
2016-03-28 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-30 16:19     ` David Howells
2016-03-31 12:21       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-31 15:18         ` David Howells
2016-03-31 15:55           ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-31 22:18             ` Mimi Zohar
2016-04-01 14:33               ` David Howells
2016-04-01 16:49                 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-04-01 14:06           ` David Howells
2016-04-01 17:07             ` Mimi Zohar
2016-04-05 20:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-04-06 16:13     ` David Howells
2016-04-06 16:47       ` Mimi Zohar

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