From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 23:00:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1461704447.5852.17.camel@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8760v464gr.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
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On Tue, 2016-04-26 at 20:07 +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:
> Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> writes:
> >
> > Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
> > was built for, not anything else. Loading a signed module meant for a
> > kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects.
> > Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is
> > force-loaded.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > ---
> > kernel/module.c | 13 +++++++++----
> > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
> > index 66426f743c29..649b1827ed15 100644
> > --- a/kernel/module.c
> > +++ b/kernel/module.c
> > @@ -2599,13 +2599,18 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
> > #endif
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
> > -static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
> > +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
> > {
> > int err = -ENOKEY;
> > const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
> > const void *mod = info->hdr;
> >
> > - if (info->len > markerlen &&
> > + /*
> > + * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
> > + * removed is no longer the module that was signed
> > + */
> > + if (flags == 0 &&
> This check is a bit lazy. We could have other flags in future,
> so this should really be !(flags &
> (MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_MODVERSIONS|MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC) right?
Yes we could, but I'd prefer this to fail-safe in case no-one thinks
about whether it should be updated then.
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings
The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance.
- Robert Coveyou
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-26 21:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-23 18:44 [PATCH 0/3] Module signing and version info Ben Hutchings
2016-04-23 18:45 ` [PATCH 1/3] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules Ben Hutchings
2016-04-26 10:37 ` Rusty Russell
2016-04-26 21:00 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2016-04-27 23:54 ` Rusty Russell
2016-04-23 18:45 ` [PATCH 2/3] Documentation/module-signing.txt: Note need for version info if reusing a key Ben Hutchings
2016-04-23 18:45 ` [PATCH 3/3] module: Disable MODULE_FORCE_LOAD when MODULE_SIG_FORCE is enabled Ben Hutchings
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