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From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: miklos@szeredi.hu, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dwalsh@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, pmoore@redhat.com,
	viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk, vgoyal@redhat.com,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label()
Date: Tue,  5 Jul 2016 11:50:52 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1467733854-6314-4-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467733854-6314-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com>

Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of
current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved
from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide
where to fetch security pointer from.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c68223c..86a07ed 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1785,13 +1785,13 @@ out:
 /*
  * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
  */
-static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
-					 const struct qstr *name,
-					 u16 tclass,
+static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const void *security,
+					 struct inode *dir,
+					 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
 					 u32 *_new_isid)
 {
 	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = security;
 
 	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
 	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
@@ -1834,8 +1834,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
-					   &newsid);
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
+					   &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2815,7 +2815,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	u32 newsid;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+					   d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
 					   inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
 					   &newsid);
 	if (rc)
@@ -2840,7 +2841,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
 		dir, qstr,
 		inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
 		&newsid);
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-07-05 15:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-05 15:50 [PATCH 0/5][RFC] Overlayfs SELinux Support Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 1/5] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 16:53   ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 17:43     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 17:20   ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 19:36   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 20:42     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 20:33     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 21:44       ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-08  7:21         ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 12:45           ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 13:42             ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 15:34               ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:35   ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:52     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 22:03       ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 2/5] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:22   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:15     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 21:34       ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-06 17:09         ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 17:50           ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:01           ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:22             ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:45   ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:53     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2016-07-05 20:25   ` [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label() Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:09     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 4/5] overlayfs: Correctly label newly created file over whiteout Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 5/5] overlayfs: Use vfs_getxattr_noperm() for real inode Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:29   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:16     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06  4:36       ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-06 10:54         ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 14:58           ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-07 18:35             ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08  7:06               ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 15:28                 ` Casey Schaufler

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